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LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO AMEND THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
SMATHERS v. SMITH*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The deliberations of Florida's Constitution Revision Commission
have received much attention. Debates have been publicized. Issues
have been scrutinized. The careful preparation for proposing constitutional changes to the people has been chronicled in depth and detail.
When the people of Florida finally vote in November, 1978,1 on the
recommendations of the revision commission, they will have had every
conceivable opportunity to become familiar with those recommendations. And this is as it should be. The people should know precisely
what choices they face when they vote on a revision of their state
constitution.
Florida's Constitution Revision Commission is "unprecedented
and unparalleled."' It is unique in all the nation.3 Nevertheless, the
Constitution Revision Commission may not play as crucial or as lasting a role in the continuing process of constitutional change in Florida
as will the Florida Legislature. True, the suggested revision in 1978,
unlike the revision in 1968, will not require legislative approval before

*Author James Bacchus served as an aide to Governor Reubin O'D. Askew during
the events described in this note.
1. In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor Request of Nov. 19, 1976 (Constitution
Revision Commission), 343 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1977). At issue in the advisory opinion was
when the revision commission should be appointed and whether the proposed revision
should be submitted to the voters in 1978 or 1980. Article XI, § 2 of the Florida
Constitution provides that the proposal shall be submitted to the people in "the
tenth year following that in which this constitution is adopted .... ." The constitution
was adopted in November, 1968. The court advised that the quoted language was "defective if read literally" in that all the terms of article XI could not be carried out
within the time limitations established by the various sections of the article. 343 So. 2d
at 21.
The court concluded in the advisory opinion that the drafters of the 1968 constitution had "simply failed to adjust the timetable set forth in Article XI, Section 2" when
reapportionment inadvertently prevented them from submitting the document for
adoption in 1967, as they had originally planned. Id. at 22. Looking beyond the document to the intent of the framers, the court advised that the commission should be
appointed in 1977 and that the proposed revision should be completed in time for submission at the 1978 general election. Id. at 23-24. Justices Karl and Adkins dissented.
They argued that the commission should not be appointed until 1978 and that the
proposed revision should not be submitted to a vote until November, 1980. Id. at 24-29.
2. Address by Reubin O'D. Askew, Governor of Florida, Opening Session, Constitution Revision Commission (July 6, 1977).
3. See Sturm, The Procedure of State Constitutional Change with Special Emphasis
on the South and Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 569 (1977).
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submission to the electorate.4 The legislators will have no chance to
revise the proposed revision in advance of the statewide vote.5 Yet,
after 1978, the Florida Constitution will not be revised again by an
appointed commission for twenty years. 6 And the members of the
Florida Legislature will, in all likelihood, retain their considerable
power to propose piecemeal changes in the form of constitutional
7
amendments throughout those twenty years.
The legislative authority to initiate constitutional change in Florida
is broad. It has been used frequently. Florida legislators have introduced 695 amendments or revisions since the adoption of the 1968
constitution . Of this total, thirty-one have been placed on the referendum ballot. 9 Twenty have been adopted by the electorate." It has
been said that a state constitution "should be a generic document
characterized by clarity, brevity, and stability that embodies timeless
principles of government.""' If this is true, then either the Florida
Legislature is exceedingly adept at discerning "timeless principles" or,
more likely, some of the legislative proposals for constitutional change
1 2
fall somewhat short of timelessness.
4. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2. A joint resolution was introduced in the 1977 legislative
session by Representative Frank Williams of Starke which would have amended this
section of the constitution to require that the work product of the Constitution Revision Commission be presented to the legislature rather than directly to the electorate.
However, the proposal was not enacted. Fla. H.R.J. Res. 1998 (1977).
5. The constitution revision process established by article XI, section 2 "was patently
designed to bypass input from the legislative branch." 343 So. 2d at 23. In contrast,
the proposal by the Constitution Revision Commission in 1967 was altered considerably
by the legislature before it was placed on the referendum ballot in 1968. The 1965 commission was created by the legislature and had no constitutional status. See Sturm, supra
note 3, at 592.
6. FLA. CONsr. art. XI, § 2.
7. FLA. CONsT. art. XI, § 1.
8. Report and Recommendations of Attorney General Robert L. Shevin to the
1978 Constitution Revision Commission 234 (June, 1977).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Report and Recommendations of Attorney General Robert L. Shevin to the
1978 Constitution Revision Commission (June, 1977) (Letter of transmittal from Attorney
General Robert L. Shevin to Commission Chairman Talbot D'Alemberte at 2).
12. For example, one amendment introduced by Senator Pat Thomas of Quincy and
endorsed by the 1975 legislature would have added section 10 to article IV of the constitution, creating a "Capitol and Mansion Commission" to "establish and maintain a
basic plan or scheme for the furnishing, decorating and alteration of the governor's
mansion and the capitol building complex .... ." Fla. S.J. Res. 999 (1975). This proposal was defeated at the polls in 1976. Florida Secretary of State, Tabulation of Official
Votes, Florida General Election, Nov. 2, 1976.
Similarly, a proposal introduced in the 1977 legislative session by Representative
Clark Maxwell of Melbourne would have added section 19 to article III of the constitution, establishing legislative salaries constitutionally at the present level of $12,000 for
the rank and file and $15,000 each for the Senate President and the Speaker of the
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Presumably, these legislative proposals are subjected routinely to
the same debate and the same scrutiny that are expected to characterize
the work of the current revision commission. Presumably, the people
of Florida will be told exactly what they are deciding when they vote
on constitutional amendments drafted by the legislature. But often
the debate and the scrutiny of legislative proposals for constitutional
change are not all that they should be. And legislative efforts to
amend the state constitution frequently do not inspire the public
attention that accompanies a full-scale revision. There are no real
guarantees, constitutional or otherwise, that Florida voters will be
sufficiently informed about the potential impact of constitutional
changes proposed by the legislature.
This insufficiency is illustrated all too well by the recent decision of
the Supreme Court of Florida in Smathers v. Smith. 13 The Smith

decision offers compelling evidence that change is needed in
the way constitutional change is pursued by the Florida Legislature.
Additional restrictions should be placed on the legislative power to
initiate alterations in Florida's fundamental charter. That power
should be checked and limited constitutionally so that changes endorsed by the legislature will be more consistent with the timeless
purposes of a constitution. And more stringent requirements should
be added to the constitution to assure the people adequate notice of
the contents and the foreseeable consequences of any constitutional
change initiated by the legislature.
Procedures for constitutional revision should allow an orderly
accommodation to emerging popular needs. At the same time, such
procedures should encourage constitutional stability and discourage
the use of the fundamental law for essentially statutory purposes.
Timelessness will often lie in the eye of the beholder. And it is
difficult at best to maintain the necessary constitutional balance
between change and constancy. In Florida, the actions of the legislature are crucial to the preservation of this precarious balance. For
this reason, Smathers v. Smith merits careful and considered attention
by all those interested in constitutional change.
II.

THE RESOLUTION

On June 4, 1976, the Florida Legislature passed and sent to
House of Representatives. Fla. H.R.J. Res. 1252 (1977).
by the legislature.

This resolution was not adopted

Such proposals would seem to be more appropriate for placement in the statutes
than in the state constitution.

13.

338 So. 2d 825 (Fla, 1976),
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Governor Reubin Askew eighty-three pieces of legislation. Among
the many measures approved on that final day of the annual legislative session was the Committee Substitute for Senate Joint Resolutions
619 and 1398.14 Passage of this resolution received relatively little
attention at the time. Other bills and other issues seemed more important in the clamor which accompanied the conclusion of the
session.'
Within a few months, however, CS/SJR 619/1398 became a topic
of statewide controversy, inspiring a spirited debate about the fundamental nature of Florida's government that ultimately reached the
state's highest court. In Smathers v. Smith, 16 the Supreme Court of
Florida held that the legislature did not exceed its power to propose
constitutional changes by enacting the joint resolution. Without dissent,
the court reversed a circuit court decision 17 and allowed the constitutional amendment proposed by the resolution to be placed on the
referendum ballot.
Three weeks later, the people of Florida rejected the amendment
overwhelmingly.' But defeat of the amendment did not end the debate
which the amendment incited. Even after judicial decision and
popular referendum, the divisive constitutional issues raised by the
legislative resolution remain essentially unresolved. The decision in
Smathers v. Smith only added to the confusion which surrounds
legislative efforts to alter the Florida Constitution.
CS/SJR 619/1398 offered an amendment to article I, section 18
of the Florida Constitution. This amendment, generally known as
the "administrative procedures amendment," would have added the
italicized language and caused that section of the Declaration of
Rights to read:
SECTION 18. Administrative penalties.-No administrative agency
shall impose a sentence of imprisonment, nor shall it impose any
other penalty except as provided by law. Any administrative rule
of any agency of the executive branch may be nullified by concurrent resolution of the Legislature on the ground that the rule is
14. FLA. S. JOUR. 457 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as CS/SJR 619/1398].
15. Among the issues which preoccupied the legislature during the last few days of
the 1976 session were education, automobile insurance, medical malpractice insurance,
mortgage fraud, water management, and the state budget. Miami Herald, June 5, 1976,
at I-A, col. 4.
16. 338 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1976).
17. Smith v. Smathers, No. 76-1931 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon County, Sept. 14, 1976),
rev'd, 338 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1976).
18. The final vote was 729,400 "For" and 1,210,001 "Against"-a landslide margin
of nearly a half million votes. Florida Secretary of State, Tabulation of Official Votes,
Florida General Election, Nov. 2, 1976.
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without or in excess of delegated legislative authority and may be
suspended as provided by law on the same ground; however, by a
majority vote of the governor and cabinet the suspension may be
deferred until acted upon by the Legislature. Failure of the Legislature to disapprove the suspension at the next regular session
shall automatically reinstate the rule.19

Senators Philip Lewis of West Palm Beach and Tom Gallen of
Bradenton initiated the resolution,20 which also had the support of
Senate President Dempsey Barron of Panama City and House Speaker
Donald Tucker of Tallahassee. 21 According to its sponsors, this pro19. CS/SJR 619/1398, supra note 14. Florida law provides that:
[W]henever a constitutional amendment or other public measure shall be submitted statewide to the vote of the people, the substance of such amendment
or other public measure shall be printed on the ballot one time, after the list
of candidates, followed by the word 'for,' and also by the word 'against,' with
a sufficient blank space thereafter for the placing of the symbol 'x' to indicate
the voter's choice.
FLA. STAT. § 101.161 (1975). The same statute indicates that "the exact wording of the
substance of the amendment or other public measure to appear on the ballot shall be
embodied in the enabling legislation . . ." rd. To this end, the legislative resolution
required that the following statement be placed on the November referendum ballot:
Proposing an amendment to the State Constitution to authorize the Legislature to
nullify or suspend any rule or regulation promulgated by the executive branch
of state government and providing a procedure for the deferral of any such
nullification which rule or regulation is without or in excess of delegated legislative authority.
CS/SJR 619/1398, supra note 14.
Plaintiff Smith maintained that this language was vague and contradicted the actual
impact of the proposed amendment. The Secretary of State said the language complied
with the statute. The amendment itself did not appear on the ballot.
20. Among the other principal supporters of the resolution were Senator John Ware
of St. Petersburg, Senator Kenneth Plante of Winter Park, Representative Robert Hector
of Miami, and Representative Curtis Kiser of Dunedin. With the exception of Senator
Plante, these legislators were all members of the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee, which had originally developed the resolution. Along with Lewis and Gallen,
they intervened for the Senate in the Smith proceeding in Leon County Circuit
Court. Later, they submitted a brief on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. Smathers v.
Smith, 338 So. 2d at 826.
21. The resolution was passed in its original form by the Senate and certified to
the House by a 30-6 vote. FLA. S. JoUR. 457 (1976). This was substantially more than
the three-fifths vote of the membership required to propose a constitutional amendment.
See FLA. CONSr. art. 11, § 1. On June 1, the resolution was read for the first time in
the House and then referred to the Committee on Governmental Operations. FLA. H.R.
JoUR. 1008 (1976). The following day, the resolution was removed from the Committee
on Governmental Operations on a motion by Representative Hector. Id. at 1061. On
June 2, the resolution was placed on the special order calendar. Id. at 1080. On June 3,
the resolution was read in the House a second time. rd. at 1183. On a motion by Representative Hector, the rules were waived and the resolution was read the required third
time. Id. at 1183; FLA. CONST. art. 3 § 7. The House voted for passage, 51-48. FLA. H.R.
JOUR. 1183 (1976). This was considerably less than the needed three-fifths vote.
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posed amendment was intended as a constitutional safeguard against
the power of executive agencies to indulge in "phantom govern22
ment."
In 1974, the legislature sought to dispel "phantom government"
with passage of a strengthened Administrative Procedure Act, 2 which
established guidelines for appeal and review of executive agency rules
' '2 4
and serves as "a legislative check on legislatively created authority.
The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act limit discretionary
actions of executive agencies and provide for public participation in
the rulemaking process.25 The act created a Joint Administrative
Procedures Committee of the legislature to review the statutory
authority for executive rulemaking and determine whether executive
agencies are acting within the scope of the powers delegated to them
26
by the legislature.
The impetus for CS/SJR 619/1398 came from the Joint AdminisHowever, immediately thereafter, Representatives Hector, Kiser, and Barry Kutun
of Miami offered an amendment which led to the requisite House approval of the
resolution. They sought to add, following the word "ground" in the resolution, the
phrase "however, by a majority vote of the governor and cabinet the suspension may
be deferred until acted upon by the Legislature." They also moved to incorporate this
proposed addition in the title to the amendment, which would eventually appear on
the general election ballot. With these changes, the resolution was submitted to a
second vote by the House and was passed, 106-0. Id. at 1183-84. The resolution was
then certified to the Senate, where it was passed as amended by the House 29-6. Id. at
654. In addition, on a motion by Senator Ware, the Senator adopted yet another amendment, adding to the title the phrase "which rule is without or in excess of delegated
legislative authority." FLA. S. JoUR. 654 (1976). This amendment was adopted by the
Senate, 25-9, and, after a final certification, by the House, 107-0. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1259
(1976); FLA. S. JOUR. 669 (1976). The measure was signed by the officers and filed with
the Secretary of State on June 10. FLA. H.R. JouR. 1259 (1976).
22. Miami Herald, Oct. 18, 1976, at 10-A, col. 1. "Phantom government" is a
popular phrase used to describe actions by government agencies which are not specifically
authorized by legislation.
23. FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1975 & Supp. 1976). The Administrative Procedure Act was
passed unanimously by both the Senate and the House and signed by the Governor on
June 25, 1974. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 74-310, 1974 Fla. Laws 952. It became
law on January 1, 1975. Id. For a discussion of the act, see generally Alford, New Ad.
ministrative Procedure Act, 48 FLA. BAR. J. 683 (1974); Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure Act: 1974 Revision and 1975 Amendments, 29 U. MIAMi L. REV. 617
(1975); The New Florida Administrative Procedure Act: Selected Presentations from the
Attorney General's Conference, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 64 (1975); England and Levinson,
Administrative Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 749 (1977); Note, Can the Joint Administrative
Procedures Committee Adequately Solve Administrative Conflict?, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 350
(1976).
24. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(10)(a) (Supp. 1976).
25. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.53-54 (Supp. 1976).
26. FLA. STAT. § 11.60 (1975). The observations of the first chairman of the committee can be found in Lewis, The Role of the Joint Legislative Administrative Procedures Committee, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 82, 83 (1975).
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trative Procedures Committee." Members of the committee were
disturbed by the reluctance of some executive agencies to amend
rules to which the committee objected.2" In the committee's first year
of operation, 1975, agencies refused to modify what the committee
described as invalid rules in only about five percent of the cases. 2
However, by 1976, the agencies were refusing to change one of every
three rules to which the legislators objected30 Most of these refusals
were made by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
and the Department of Environmental Regulation, two agencies which
are responsible directly to the Governor and not to the Governor and
the cabinet sitting collectively as an executive board. s1
The adamance of these and other executive agencies may not have
been anticipated by some of those who endorsed the Administrative
Procedure Act in 1974.22 But most legislators realized by 1976 that
27. Interview with Carroll Webb, Executive Director, Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (Aug. 3, 1977).
28. Id. Under the present provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency
is given three options when the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee objects to
a rule. The agency may withdraw the rule in whole or in part; it may modify the
rule to meet the objection; or it may refuse to modify or withdraw the rule. FLA. STAT.
§ 120.54(10)(a) (Supp. 1976). When CS/SJR 619/1398 was passed, if an agency refused
to modify or withdraw a rule, the committee's only authorized response was to give notice
in the Florida Administrative Weekly stating the grounds for the objection. FLA. STAT.
§ 120.54(12) (Supp. 1976). In addition, the committee could require that a footnote be
placed with the rule in the Florida Administrative Code stating that the committee
had found the rule to be outside the delegated legislative authority. Id.
29. Memorandum from Carroll Webb to Senator Lew Brantley, at 2 (Oct. 21, 1976).
In 1975, 282 objections to agency rules were made by the committee. In 13 instances, or
about 4.6% of the cases, the agency refused to modify the rule. Interview with Carroll
Webb, supra note 27.
30. "In the first 7 months of 1976 we find of our 108 objections to rules, the
agencies have refused to modify or change 38 of these rules or about 32 percent. That
alone answers the question why we need this constitutional amendment." Memorandum
from Carroll Webb to Senator Lew Brantley, supra note 29. In all of 1976, the committee objected to 154 executive agency rules. Of this total, the agencies refused to
modify 56 rules, or about 36%. Interview with Carroll Webb, supra note 27. This was
nearly nine times the percentage of refusals in the previous year. See note 29 supra.
Through the first seven months of 1977, the committee had entered objections to 58
agency rules. The agencies had refused to modify 24 of those rules, or about 41%. Interview with Carroll Webb, supra note 27. Thus, while the number of objections decreased
slightly, the percentage of refusals continued to increase.
31. Interview with Carroll Webb, supranote 27.
32. When the Act was originally drafted, it was felt that the expressed, publicized
disapproval of a joint standing committee of the Legislature would be a sufficient
deterrent to protect the people of Florida from the effects of unlawful rules and
regulations. In short, it was anticipated that it would be a rare occasion when
an agency would refuse to modify a rule to which the Committee had objected
and would insist upon continuing to enforce it after having been notified that
the rule was without authority and violative of legislative intent.
Memorandum from Carroll Webb to all Members of the Legislature, entitled "Changes
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the agencies of the executive branch did not always welcome the oversight of a legislative committee. This realization gave rise to the joint
resolution. As one supporter of the administrative procedures amendment explained, "It became obvious that unless the Committee's review
could be made genuinely meaningful the basic thrust of the [Administrative Procedure] Act would be thwarted."'3
The Joint Administrative Procedures Committee depicted the
proposed amendment as "simplicity itself.' ' 3 4 "What the amendment
does can be stated in a few words," the committee's executive director
wrote in a memorandum circulated to all legislators shortly after
adoption of the resolution.3 5
Whenever an agency adopts an illegal rule, that is, a rule which
goes beyond its legislatively delegated authority, that rule may be
nullified by a Concurrent Resolution of the full Legislature and
may be suspended as provided by law in the interim unless the
36
Governor and Cabinet act to defer the suspension.

Thus, CS/SJR 619/1398 ostensibly would have done little more than
write the statutory principles of the Administrative Procedure Act
into the Florida Constitution.3 1 Within the legislature, the resolution
had few opponents.38
in the Administrative Procedure Act by the 1976 Legislature," at 4 (Sept. 9, 1976). Webb
had been a member of the 1974 Legislature and voted for the Administrative Procedure
Act. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1335 (1974).

33. Memorandum from Carroll Webb to all Members of the Legislature, supra note
32 at 4. "The concept of legislative oversight is the cornerstone of the Administrative
Procedure Act," Webb said. Id. "If the Committee's review of administrative rules is to
have no effect, then the effectiveness of the whole act is so diminished as to make it
questionable whether the remaining provisions of the Act can be justified." Id.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Id. No mention was made in the memorandum of the obvious irony in explaining the supposed consequences of a resolution to members of the legislature after
they had endorsed it with their votes.
36. Id.
37. "What could be more important than that?" Senator Lewis asked one reporter.
"If this amendment does anything different from what it says, I want to know." Miami
Herald, Oct. 18, 1976, at 10-A, col. 1. Senator Lewis was then chairman of the Joint
Administrative Procedures Committee.
38. The final vote in the Senate was 29-6; there were no opposing votes in the
House. See note 21 supra. Voting against final passage in the Senate were Senators Edgar
Dunn of Daytona Beach, George Firestone of Miami, Jack Gordon of Miami Beach,
Robert Graham of Miami Lakes, Vernon Holloway of Miami, Harry Johnston of West
Palm Beach, Kenneth Myers of Miami, Richard Renick of Coral Gables, and Sherman
Winn of Miami. FLA. S. JouR. 654 (1976). One House member, Representative Barry
Richard of Miami, voted "nay" after the final roll call vote, which was 107-0. Another,
Representative David Lehman of Hollywood, changed his vote from "yea" to "nay"
after the final vote. FLA. H.R. Joua. 1259

(1976).
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Outside the legislature, however, opposition to the administrative
procedures amendment soon proved formidable. Governor Askew had
signed the Administrative Procedure Act in 1974.39 He voiced no
public opposition to the proposed constitutional amendment during
the 1976 session. 40 However, several weeks after the session ended, he
vetoed Senate Bill 1384, the implementing legislation for the proposed
constitutional amendment.4 1 This was the first public indication that
39. The Governor signed the bill on June 25, 1974. Administrative Procedure Act,
ch. 74-310, 1974 Fla. Laws 952.
40. However, in his opening address to the 1976 session, the Governor had departed
from the programmatic tradition of his previous legislative addresses and delivered a
sustained lecture on the necessity for separation of powers in the state government.
This address was delivered following months of increasing friction between the Askew
administration and some members of the legislature. Florida Times Union, Apr. 11, 1976,
at B-2, col. 1.
Following his reelection in 1974, the Governor had claimed a "mandate" from the
people for full disclosure of personal finances by elected officials, a reform the legislature had resisted for several years. Address by Reubin O'D. Askew, Governor of Florida,
to the Florida Legislature (Apr. 8, 1975); FLA. H.R. JoUR. 3, 8 (1975). Senate President
Dempsey Barron responded to this, and to other attempts by Askew to influence the
legislature, by telling the Governor-from the Senate podium and on statewide public
television-to "stay the hell out" of the business of the Senate. Miami Herald, May 24,
1975, at I-A, col. 1. Askew replied the following week: "It is the people's Senate and
the business of the Florida Senate is the people's business and I'm up here representing
the people of Florida." Florida Times Union, May 24, 1975, at B-2, col. 1. "I don't
intend to let anyone, including Mr. Barron, intimidate me from doing anything that
I think I must do for the people of Florida ....
I've been fighting for 17 years and
I intend to keep fighting." Miami Herald, May 24, 1975, at l-A, col. 1.
The Governor then took the financial disclosure issue, together with other ethics
proposals, to the people through use of the initiative provision in the Florida Constitution. See FLA. CONsT. art. XI, § 3. The Askew campaign for what the Governor described
as the "Sunshine Amendment" began in November, 1975, and continued throughout the
1976 legislative session, adding little to prospects for harmony between the Governor and
the legislative leadership. Miami Herald, Jul. 30, 1976, at 1-A, col. 3. Meanwhile, Askew
and a number of legislators engaged in confrontations on other issues, ranging from
the delivery of social services to the investigative powers of the Florida Department of
Criminal Law Enforcement. Florida Times Union, Apr. 11, 1976, at B-2, col. 1. The
climax came when Askew used his traditional forum on the opening day of the 1976
legislative session, not to submit specific proposals, but rather to offer what was described as a "civics lesson" in Florida government to the surprised lawmakers. 1d. Askew
reminded them:
There is a separation of powers in Florida-a separation of powers established by
our Constitution. . . . I would never question the right of the Legislature to
exercise responsibilities reserved for the legislature by our Constitution. As someone who served in the legislature for twelve years, I know that good government
in Florida must rely, in part, on a proper use of legislative authority. But that
authority does not extend to unwarranted intrusions and unnecessary invasions
into the responsibilities of the executive branch.
FLA. H.R. JOuR. 4, 6 (1976) (Address by Reubin O'D. Askew, Governor of Florida, to the
Florida Legislature (Apr. 6, 1976)).
41. FLA. S. JoUR. 122 (1977) (Veto message of Reubin O'D. Askew, Governor of
Florida, regarding Senate Bill 1384 (June 29, 1976)). Senate Bill 1384 would have created
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the Governor disapproved of the administrative procedures amendment. In his veto message, the Governor maintained that adoption of
the proposed amendment "would jeopardize the rights of the individual citizen through an unwarranted intrusion into the province
of the executive and judicial branches."4 2 He denounced the implementing bill and the companion resolution as "an experiment in
43
government foreign to our tradition of checks and balances ....
However, while the Governor can veto implementing legislation,
he cannot veto proposed amendments to the state constitution.4 This
§ 201.547, replacing FLA. STAT. § 120.545, which would have been repealed. The
first five subsections of the proposed law were identical to the corresponding subsections
of the existing law. The final three subsections detailed the procedures to be used by
the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee when an agency refused to modify,
amend, withdraw, or repeal a rule to which the committee had objected.
Under these provisions, the committee would have been required to notify the Department of State whenever an agency had failed to respond to an objection within
the prescribed time. Upon receipt of the committee's notice, the Department of State
would have been required to give notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of the
committee's action. Upon publication of this notice, the disputed rule would have been
suspended until acted upon by the full legislature by concurrent resolution.
The suspension of any rule by this means could have been deferred, by a majority
vote of the Governor and Cabinet, until acted upon by the legislature; the suspension of a
rule would have ended in any event upon consideration by the legislature. Passage ot
a concurrent resolution disapproving the rule would have replaced the temporary suspension with a permanent nullification. In contrast, failure of the legislature to pass
the concurrent resolution would have stopped the suspension, and the rule would have
been restored to full force and effect five days after the final vote on the resolution.
42. Veto message, supra note 41.
43. Id. The Governor's veto message echoed the concerns he had expressed in his
earlier legislative address: "Although the proponents have claimed that this process
would protect the citizen from excesses in rulemaking, in my opinion, it would do the
opposite." Id. He praised the Administrative Procedure Act, describing it as "a system
of administrative law which is viewed as a model by other states" and "already provides
a remedy against overreaching by executive rulemaking." Id. But going beyond the
Act in the manner described in Senate Bill 1384, he insisted, would do away with an
individual citizen's right under the Act to "an impartial, legal hearing before a professional hearing officer or judge .... ." Id. Instead, the vetoed measure would substitute
"the political forum" of a legislative committee and place the rights of the people "in
the hands of a growing legislative bureaucracy." Id. In addition, the Governor argued
that the constitutional amendment, if enacted, would bypass the established checks and
balances of judicial review and gubernatorial veto, and thus was "inconsistent with
the basic structure of the Florida Constitution." Id.
44. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. This was also true under the 1885 Constitution. "It
is not necessary for the Governor to concur in a proposed amendment to the Constitution." Collier v. Gray, 157 So. 40, 45 (Fla. 1934) (citations omitted). Rather,
[t]he Constitution itself provides for the method for its amendment, modification,
or repeal of any particular section. It cannot be modified, amended or repealed
in any particular by legislative fiat, executive usurpation, or judicial interpretation or construction. If there is to be modification, amendment, or repeal, it
must be in the manner and method provided for in the fundamental law itself.
State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 60 So. 2d 747, 754 (Fla. 1952).
FLA. STAT.
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is a power reserved to the people. 45 And Senate leaders promised to
override Askew's veto of Senate Bill 1384 following what they expected
would be an endorsement of the administrative procedures amendment by the voters in the November general election. 4 The debate
over the power of the legislature to propose changes in the Florida
Constitution had begun.
III. THE SUIT
In the aftermath of the Governor's veto, Lakeland attorney Chesterfield Smith entered the growing controversy. Smith was chairman of
Florida's Constitution Revision Commission from 1965 to 1968. He
shared with Governor Askew a concern about what seemed to them
to be an increasing legislative encroachment on the rightful powers
47
of the executive and judicial branches of Florida's state government.
On September 8, Smith filed suit as a "citizen, taxpayer, and elector
of the State of Florida" in Leon County Circuit Court. 48 He depicted

the proposed amendment as an "unlawful, improper, and wasteful
expenditure of public funds" and asked for a permanent injunction
to restrain Secretary of State Bruce Smathers, the chief state elections
49
officer, from placing the issue on the ballot.
Smith argued that the administrative procedures amendment was
unconstitutional on four separate grounds: it would have altered by
"implication and indirection" the separation of powers required by
article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution;" it was not an "amendment" of a single section but rather a "revision" of at least three
51
articles and yet was not portrayed as a "revision" by the legislature;
The people, of course, exercise the ultimate veto when they cast their votes.
§ 12(d).
46. "He has laid down the gauntlet," Senator Lewis said of Askew's veto. Tallahassee
Democrat, Jul. 11, 1976, at 10-A, col. 2. "One of the biggest problems we face today
is a Phantom Government interfering with our lives," declared Senator Brantley, who
claimed the amendment would help prevent such interference. Miami Herald, Oct. 18,
1976, at 10-A, col. 1. Likewise, Senator Ware described the proposal as "a legislative
response to the growing trend of the executive department to write laws not authorized
by statute." Tallahassee Democrat, Jul. 11, 1976, at 10-A, col. 2.
47. Address by Chesterfield Smith, Ivy League Club, Sarasota, Florida (Feb. 3, 1976).
48. Smith v. Smathers, No. 76-1931 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon County Sept. 14, 1976).
49. Complaint at 4.
50. Complaint at 5. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 provides: "The powers of the state
government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person
belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other
branches unless expressly provided herein."
51. Complaint at 5, 18. Article XI, section 1 of the Florida Constitution, concerning
legislative proposals for constitutional amendments, reads:
Amendment of a section or revision of one or more articles, or the whole, of
this constitution may be proposed by joint resolution agreed to by three-fifths of
45.

See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5; art. X,
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it violated article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution and the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution by delegating
legislative powers to a malapportioned legislative committee and, thus,
denied equal protection of the laws; 52 and it threatened "misunderstandings and conflicts" by including a confusing double negative in
the second of the two sentences that would have been added to article
I, section 18.5 3
the membership of each house of the legislature. The full text of the joint resolution and the vote of each member voting shall be entered on the journal of
each house.
52. Complaint at 5. Article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution, entitled "Basic
Rights," reads:
All natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among
which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness,
to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property; except
that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and possession of real property by
aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law. No person
shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion or physical handicap.
Section one of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution reads
in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
53. The second sentence reads as follows: "Failure of the legislature to disapprove
the suspension at the next regular session shall automatically reinstate the rule." CS/SJR
619/1398, supra note 14. In his complaint, Smith observed, "Whether or not this double
negative is the result of unfortunate draftmanship is not evident. The statement is,
however, unintelligible and can lead to absurd results." Complaint at 21-22. He then
attempted to illustrate what those results might be:
Suppose an agency of the executive branch enacts a rule. The Administrative
Procedures Committee, or whatever entity has been delegated the authority to
suspend rules, then suspends the rule. The Governor and Cabinet take no action
and the rule remains 'suspended' until the next regular session of the legislature. Must the legislature resolve to approve or disapprove the suspension? Must
the legislature fail to disapprove the suspension by a vote on a concurrent resolution resolving to disapprove the suspension? Suppose the legislature does nothing
at its next regular session. What if the legislature, in fact, approves of the suspension but does not pass a concurrent resolution nullifying the rule? According
to the wording of the proposed amendment, the legislature having failed to disapprove the suspension, the rule is automatically reinstated. What happens if
the legislature resolves to approve the suspension? The legislature thus has
exhibited its approval of the suspension and its disapproval of the rule, which by
the opening words of the amendment would seem to nullify the rule. But by
failing to disapprove the suspension, the rule is automatically reinstated. There,
therefore, would be produced a rule which is nullified and reinstated at the same
time.
Id. (emphasis in original). Later, in argument before the supreme court, the defendant
conceded that the amendment was flawed by "vagueness" and "poor draftsmanship" and
was "contradictory" in places. Miami Herald, Oct. 6, 1976, at 16-D, col. 5. The defendant
maintained, however, that "the court would be hard pressed to find a fatal defect to
keep it from the people . . . who in their wisdom . . . will vote it down if they find

it contradictory." Id.
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Smith also maintained that the notice of the amendment's contents
which would actually appear on the ballot violated Florida law by not
accurately depicting the amendment's true effect. 54 And, finally, he
argued that the wording of both the ballot notice and the administrative procedures amendment itself was inadequate to inform the public
of what he perceived as the substantial shift in governmental power
that would result from adoption of the amendment. 55 According to
Smith, "[T]he proposed amendment, without giving notice thereof
to the electorate, would constitute a wide-ranging revision of the
Constitution, fundamentally altering the carefully constructed constitutional separation of powers among the legislative, judicial and
executive branches of government of the state." 56
Smith did not contend that the separation of powers in Florida
could not be changed. Instead, he argued that the state constitution
provides that the separation of powers can only be changed "expressly."57 And Smith argued that the proposed constitutional amendment would authorize "the exercise by the legislative branch of power
54. Florida law requires that "the substance" of the proposed amendment appear
on the ballot. FLA. STAT. § 101.161 (1975); see note 19 supra. Smith alleged that the
notice provided by the resolution did not contain the substance of the amendment. He
made two specific points. First, he noted that the wording to be placed on the ballot
said the amendment would authorize the legislature to suspend any rule or regulation
promulgated by the executive branch. As Smith explained,
the amendment provides that suspension is to be made as provided by law. The
proposed enabling act provides for the suspension to be made by the Administrative Procedures Committee of the legislature. The proposed wording for the ballot
wholly fails to notify the electorate that some legislative designee, not the legislature, [would] be granted the right to suspend executive agency rules.
Complaint at 24.
Second, Smith observed that the proposed wording for the ballot stated incorrectly
that the amendment provided "a procedure for the deferral of any such nullification,"
when in fact there was no procedure at all in the proposed amendment for "deferral"
or for any other action subsequent to a nullification. id. Neither of these points was
discussed by the supreme court, which evidently concluded that the legislature had
fulfilled the statutory requirements as well as the constitutional requirements for placing
a proposed constitutional amendment on the ballot.
55. Complaint at 4.
56. Id. (emphasis in original).
57. Complaint at 6; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.Smith observed that
[t]he principle of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches, is so fundamental to the governmental concept of the Florida
Constitution that the exercise by any person belonging to one branch of a power
appertaining to another is forbidden unless expressly otherwise provided for in
the Constitution.
Complaint at 6 (emphasis in original). From this he concluded that "[iut is the clear
constitutional intent to keep the power of each branch of government inviolate from
excursions upon its authority by another branch, subject only to the checks and balances
among the branches as these are expressly provided for in the Constitution." Id. (emphasis
in original).
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appertaining to the judicial and executive branches, without expressly so providing."58 "On the contrary," Smith said, "the proposed
transfer of powers . . . , far from being express, appears designedly to
be cast by the amendment in a form to avoid calling attention to
this fact. '"5 Furthermore, the amendment was "not even germane" to
60
the section of the constitution to which it would have been added.
Specifically, Smith maintained that adoption of the administrative
procedures amendment would transfer inherent judicial power from
the judiciary to the legislature. The judiciary would no longer have
the exclusive and traditional right "upon appropriate presentation of
the issue, to pass judgment on the meaning, scope, and application
Moreover, "[b]y the proposed
.,61
"..
of a legislative enactment .
amendment the legislature would be granted the right to make the
entirely judicial determination as to whether an administrative rule,
enacted under purported legislative authority, was in fact authorized
by law." 62 In addition, the language of the amendment "would empower the legislature to delegate to a committee of the legislature, or
some legislatively designated entity, the right to make this judicial
determination . .

.,,"

Smith argued that the proposed amendment would infringe on
inherent executive powers by transferring most of the rule-making
authority from the executive to the legislature.6 4 This would supposedly have included not only rules implementing legislation, but
also rules related solely to the internal administration of the executive
branch.6 5 As Smith described it, "The proposed amendment would
empower the legislature to accomplish by indirection what the constitution forbids directly."6 6 That is, traditionally, a legislature dissatisfied
with a rule enacted by an executive agency would enact legislation
removing rule-making authority from that agency. Under the Florida
67
Constitution, such legislation would be subject to an executive veto.
Smith believed that the administrative procedures amendment would
permit the legislature, or conceivably a single legislative committee,
to circumvent the veto power of the Governor and, "[flor an executive
veto of the legislation (subject to override), there would be substituted
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Complaint at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13.
See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8.
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a legislative veto of executive action not subject to override or review."88
In his complaint, Smith acknowledged the legitimacy of legislative
fears of "phantom government."'69 He conceded that CS/SJR 619/1398
had been conceived "in good faith and in an attempt to meet this
governmental concern."70 Even so, he insisted, this legislative attempt
to eliminate "phantom government" would only substitute a more
objectionable form of government for Florida by upsetting the balance
of power among the legislative, judicial, and executive branches. The
voters would be revising the constitution when they thought they were
merely amending it. And they would be given no indication of the
71
possible results of their votes at the polls.

Smith did not deny that the legislature could have proposed a
revision of one or more articles of the constitution or even a revision
of the entire constitution had the legislators so desired. He admitted
that those alternatives were clearly available to the legislature under
the broad terms of article XI, section 1.72 However, he argued that

the administrative procedures amendment could not be submitted
to the voters "[i]n the manner in which it has been proposed."'73 What
posed as an "amendment," he declared, was actually a "revision." The
legislative proposal was "constitutionally defective and unauthorized
because it is styled as an 'amendment' to a section when in actuality
it is a 'revision' of the Florida Constitution which would amend,
modify, change or otherwise affect multiple provisions of the Florida
Constitution, as well as substantially change established constitutional
principles of government."

74

The administrative procedures amend-

ment was "innocently worded."' 75 But Smith insisted that it would
have the "extraordinary effect ...

of revising the constitutional system

of checks and balances between the separate branches of government,
of fundamentally altering the existing separation of powers between
the three branches, of transferring the powers of two of the branches
68. Complaint at 13.
69. Id. at 17.
70. Id.
71. Smith suggested that instead of seeking passage of constitutional amendments,
the legislature should "control 'phantom government' by careful oversight .... ..
by
lobbying the agencies, by legislative investigations, by the enactment or repeal of laws,
by controlling the expenditure of funds through the appropriation process, by publicity
campaigns, by instituting judicial review of agency rules and decisions, and by numerous
other actions ....
Id. at 18.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 18.
75. Id. at 19.
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to a third, and of compromising the right to judicial review. "76 To
Smith, this was reason enough to conclude that the legislature had
exceeded its powers to propose constitutional changes.
The suit proceeded quickly. Secretary of State Smathers moved to
dismiss Smith's complaint, alleging that Smith did not have standing
7
to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court.1 The motion was
76. Id. at 19-20.
77. Jurisdiction in the suit was based on a constitutional provision giving the
circuit courts "the power of direct review of administrative action prescribed by general
law." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b). The administrative action in question was the ministerial
duty of the Secretary of State to place the proposed amendment on the ballot. See Crawford v. Gilchrist, 59 So. 963, 967 (Fla. 1912). Smith claimed this would result in the
unlawful and unauthorized expenditure of public funds. Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2. The defendant argued that Smith
could not sue because he had alleged no injury particular or special to himself, but
merely an injury that he shared in common with the other taxpayers in the state. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1. The defendant relied on Rickman v. Whitehurst, 74
So. 205 (Fla. 1917), in which the Supreme Court of Florida held that, in order to sue
the state in an equitable proceeding, a citizen and taxpayer must demonstrate a special
injury particular to himself and different from the injury to all other citizens and taxpayers. See Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Standing.
In reply, Smith maintained that his suit represented an acknowledged exception to
the "special injury" rule established by Rickman. He noted a long series of decisions by
the supreme court to the effect that a taxpayer has standing to sue without special
injury to enjoin the unlawful expenditure of public funds and to protect tax funds
against illegal disbursements which would result from unauthorized or illegal actions
of public officials: Wester v. Belote, 138 So. 721 (Fla. 1931); Crawford v. Gilchrist, 59
So. 963 (Fla. 1912); Anderson v. Fuller, 41 So. 684 (Fla. 1906); Peck v. Spencer, 7 So.
642 (Fla. 1890); Lanier v. Padgett, 18 Fla. 842 (1882). Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2-3. He also cited the long line of
cases in which the court had accorded standing to citizens, residents, and taxpayers who
challenged proposed constitutional amendments on the basis that the proposals were
unconstitutional in form and content and, therefore, would cause an unlawful expenditure of public funds: Goldner v. Adams, 167 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1964); Pope v. Gray, 104
So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1958); Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1958); Gray v. Golden,
89 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1956); Gray v. Winthrop, 156 So. 270 (Fla. 1934); Gray v. Moss, 156
So. 262 (Fla. 1934); Crawford v. Gilchrist, 59 So. 963 (Fla. 1912). Plaintiff's Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 3-4.
According to Smith, "[n]one of the cases supporting the 'special injury' doctrine overrule or treat the recognized exception made in circumstances where a proposed constitutional amendment is being challenged by a taxpayer alleging that the submission
of the proposal to the electorate will result in unlawful expenditure of public funds . . ."
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 6. Furthermore, Smith argued that his case could be distinguished from the rule established by
the Supreme Court of Florida in Department of Administration v. Home, 269 So. 2d
659 (Fla. 1972). In Home, the court held that "where there is an attack upon constitutional grounds based directly upon the legislature's taxing and spending power, there is
standing to sue without the Rickman requirement of special injury, which will obtain
in other cases." Id. at 663 (emphasis in original). Smith said those "other cases" mentioned in Horne do not include suits such as the one he filed against the Secretary of
State. Instead, he contended that the Home decision was "narrow" and "did not overrule any . . . prior decisions granting such standing in taxpayer suits." Plaintiff's
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denied.78 The legislative sponsors of the resolution intervened on
behalf of Smathers.79 Nonetheless, the circuit court entered summary
judgment for Smith.80
The circuit court held that the legislative resolution violated
article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution since it was "not
express" and would "cause a change in the separation of powers
principle."8 " In addition, the circuit court agreed with Smith that
the resolution violated article XI, section 1 because it was "so vague
and ambiguous" that it was "improperly proposed."'8 2 The circuit
court made no mention of Smith's other arguments. With the general
election less than six weeks away, this summary judgment prohibited
the Secretary of State from placing the proposed amendment on the
ballot. Smathers immediately took a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court of Florida in an effort to resolve the constitutional issues at
stake.

83

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 11. Thus, the Home
court not only reaffirmed the Rickman rule, but also endorsed the exceptions to that
rule. The circuit court agreed with this argument and denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss. The issue of standing was not raised in the later appeal to the supreme court.
78. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Smith v. Smathers, No. 76-1931 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Leon County Sept. 14, 1976).
79. Senators Lewis, Ware, Plante, and Gallen and Representatives Hector and Kiser
were allowed to intervene on similar grounds to those which Smith used in filing suit:
that money would be wasted by leaving the amendment off the ballot and requiring
the measure to go back through the legislative process again in the next regular session.
Florida Times Union, Sept. 16, 1976, at B-2, col. 4.
80. Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Smith v. Smathers,
No. 76-1931 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon County Sept. 14, 1976).
81. Order Amending Summary Judgment, Smith v. Smathers, No. 76-1931 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Leon County Sept. 29, 1976).
82. Id.
83. Smathers pursued the appeal as a ministerial function of his position as Secretary of State and without taking any public stand either for or against the proposed
amendment. He did not endorse the proposed constitutional change until after the circuit
court decision was reversed by the supreme court. Even then, he did not campaign
vigorously for passage of the amendment. "'I don't want to put myself in opposition
to or argument with any individual,' Smathers said. 'I'm just expressing my own opinion
as head of the Department of State.'" Miami Herald, Oct 16, 1976, at B-2, col. 5.
In contrast, Attorney General Robert Shevin eventually expressed strong public
opposition to the amendment. As required by law, the Attorney General assisted Smathers
in preparing and presenting his case in Smith. However, shortly after the supreme court
decision, Shevin denounced the amendment. "The people of Florida are being required
by the Legislature to vote on an amendment to their constitution without knowing what
the full effects of the amendment would be," the Attorney General said. News Release,
Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida (Oct. 20, 1976). The proposed amendment, he declared, "envisions a radical and extreme change in our state system of democratic government." Id. It "gives to a select group of legislators and their small staff
the authority to void the laws of their state." Id.
In a departure from conventional procedure, the supreme court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction in the case after it arrived on appeal. This was done by Chief
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By this time, the administrative procedures amendment had long
since emerged from its initial obscurity. Governor Askew continued
his denunciations. At one point, he called the proposed amendment
"the most insidious proposal that has come before state government
since I've been there,"' 4 for it would put "concentrated, unchecked
power . . . in the hands of a few."' 5 Following the Governor's lead,

many of the major newspapers in the state lined up against the pro86
posed amendment.
Justice Overton on motion by the defendant because, initially, the circuit court judge
did not specify his reasons for granting Smith's motion for summary judgment. Smathers
v. Smith, No. 50,288 (Fla. Sept. 28, 1976). The Florida Constitution allows direct appeal
to the supreme court of decisions by district courts of appeal and orders by trial courts
"construing a provision of the state or federal constitution." FLA. CONST. art. V, §
3(b)(1).

That same day, the case was returned briefly to the circuit court, where the Secretary
of State moved to amend the summary judgment. He explained that "[u]nless the Court
gives reasons for its Final Summary Judgment, construing a provision of the State Constitution, there is a serious question as to whether a direct appeal may be taken to the
Florida Supreme Court." Motion to Amend Final Summary Judgment, Smith v. Smathers,
No. 76-1931 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon County, Sept. 28, 1976). The circuit judge then gave
his reasons, which supplied the constitutional construction required for a direct appeal.
Order Amending Summary Judgment, No. 76-1931 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon County, Sept.
29, 1976).
84. St. Petersburg Times, Oct. 2, 1976, at 3-B, col. 1.
85. Id. "They can suspend anything we do," Askew said about the increased legislative power which he believed would result from adoption of the amendment. "If they're
able to do that, they will break down the whole system of government." Id. On another
occasion he said, "You have in this amendment the most insidious attack on our basic
government in its two hundred years of existence." Miami Herald, Oct. 18, 1976, at
10-A, col. 1. The Governor criss-crossed the state throughout September and October,
focusing much of his attention in the electoral campaign on the administrative procedures amendment. Id.
86. The St. Petersburg Times observed:
We suspect on this one the Court will concur with constitutional lawyer Chesterfield Smith that the amendment is both ambiguous and a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. However, if the court should reverse . . . , it will be
up to the voters to reject this legislative power grab and maintain a proper
balance between the branches of Florida government.
St. Petersburg Times, Oct. 3, 1976, at 2-D, col, 1.
"While the arguments may be technical and complicated, the effects of the changes
are simple enough to understand," said the Miami Herald.
The Legislature would usurp from the Governor and Cabinet and their agencies
some of the authority reserved to them by the State Constitution.
We do not like the amendment because it does violence to the principle of
the separation of powers. Our position, as stated earlier, is that the voters should
be given the opportunity to kill the monster themselves, instead of leaving the
task to the court. But either way, the proposal needs to be laid to rest.
Miami Herald, Oct. 7, 1976, at 6-A, col. 1.
The Orlando Sentinel Star took yet another approach: "Our reason for opposing
the amendment is that it isn't necessary. The legislature already has the power to
enact laws that curb executive branch power. Indeed, every session sees a sheaf of
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But the legislative leadership remained firmly in favor of the
resolution. In a letter mailed to newspaper editors throughout the
state, Senator Lewis and the new chairman of the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee, Representative Robert Hector of Miami,
described Smith's suit as a "last-minute . . . attempt to prevent Florida
voters from having the opportunity to curb the practice of state
bureaucrats in the promulgation of rules which have the full force of
law, but which have no statutory authority." ' The legislators compared these supposed practices of the executive agencies to "reports
of the tapping of thousands of telephones of innocent citizens by the
Federal government without legal authority . . . ,"" Meanwhile, Secretary of State Smathers advised the supreme court that a prompt ruling
was imperative. He said he had to print and distribute the ballots no
later than October 11 to be assured that the proposed constitutional
amendments would appear before the electorate."9
It was in this anxious and politically perilous context that the supreme court considered Smathers' appeal. Briefs were hurriedly submitted by all parties to the controversy.90 Oral arguments were heard
them enacted." Orlando Sentinel Star, Sept. 16, 1976, at A-12, col. 1. There was no
apparent press support for the amendment, a fact which may have had much to do
with its eventual defeat.
87. Letter from Senator Lewis and Representative Hector to editors of Florida newspapers (Sept. 21, 1976) (copy on file with author).
88. Id.
89. "Actually, even October 11 was too late," the Director of the Division of Elections in the Department of State, Mary Singleton, said later. "Many people did not get
their absentee ballots in time to vote because of the Smith suit and other challenges to
the ballot which were then before the court. Some people, in effect, lost their franchise."
Interview with Mary Singleton, Director of the Division of Elections, Department of
State (Mar. 28, 1977).
When Smith filed his suit, 8,000 posters were being printed with the full text of all
proposed amendments. These posters were to be distributed originally in the first week
of October to all the polling places in the state. Counties ordinarily prepare their ballots
for the printers between the first and second weeks of October in an election year. When
the ballots return from the printers, they are placed in the machines, and the machines
are then inspected and sealed. It is still possible thereafter to remove an amendment
from the ballot, but the expense of such a change runs into thousands of dollars. Id,
90. An amicus curiae brief was submitted by the Florida Audubon Society, which
intervened on appeal in support of Smith. The Audubon Society agreed with Smith that
the proposed amendment was not an amendment of a single section but rather a revision of several articles. "The basic issue here is fairness," the Society contended. "Are
those offering the change giving the public a fair chance to evaluate the proposal and
freely approve or disapprove it?" Brief of Florida Audubon Society as Amicus Curiae at I.
The Audubon Society joined other opponents of the amendment in a statewide
campaign to defeat it once the court restored it to the ballot. Environmentalists feared
that the amendment would allow land developers to abolish the stringent dredge-and-fill
permit rules of the State Department of Environmental Regulation by lobbying the
legislators on the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. Tampa Tribune, October
12, 1976, at 7-A, col. 3. "It is purely and simply a very bad and dangerous amendment
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within several days."' During oral argument, it appeared the court
might affirm the circuit court decision. Pointing to the second sentence
of the proposed amendment, Justice Boyd suggested that the court
would have to interpret "disapprove" to mean "approve" to make any
sense of the amendment. 92 "If we're sitting here having difficulty
knowing what it means," he asked, "how can we expect hundreds of
thousands of others to know what it means? ' ' 93 Justice England addedin apparent agreement with Smith-that the legislature already had
the power it needed to change rules by abolishing an agency's rulemaking power or by simply not voting any money for the agency in
the state budget. 94 And Chief Justice Overton asked questions which
seemed to reveal a concern on his part that the proposed amendment
would diminish the constitutional powers of the judiciary-again re95
flecting Smith's assertions.
Yet, on October 11, a unanimous supreme court reversed the
lower court and restored the administrative procedures amendment
to the referendum ballot. 96 Justice England wrote the majority opinion,
which was joined by Chief Justice Overton and by Justices Roberts,
Adkins, Sundberg, and Hatchett. 97 Justice Boyd submitted a concurring opinion.9 The court dismissed the separation of powers issue
and we're going to do everything in our power to make sure it's defeated," said the
Society's executive director, Hal Scott. Id.
91. Florida Times Union, Oct. 6, 1976, at B-1, col. 2.
92. Id.
93. Miami Herald, Oct. 6, 1976, at 16-D, col. 5.
94. Florida Times Union, Oct. 6, 1976, at B-I, col. 2.
95. Id.
96. Smathers v. Smith, 338 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1976).
Three of the seven justices on the supreme court were Askew appointees: Chief
Justice Overton, Justice Sundberg, and Justice Hatchett. A fourth, Justice England, was
once an Askew aide. All four opposed the Governor on this issue, at least insofar as
keeping the proposed amendment off the ballot was concerned. Justice England, author
of the court's opinion, had also served as a reporter to the Law Revision Council in
1973. In that capacity, he had prepared the original drafts of what became the Administrative Procedure Act of 1974. Kennedy, A National Perspective of Administrative
Law and the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 65, 66 (1975).
97. 338 So. 2d at 825.
98. Id. at 832. Justice Boyd concurred with the majority's opinion in the case except
for that portion approving of Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1970), in which
the court rejected a proposed initiative petition which sought to establish a unicameral
legislature. Justice Boyd noted his dissent in Gunter, adding, "I still feel that the people
should have been permitted to vote upon the question of whether to adopt a unicameral
Legislature." 338 So. 2d at 832. Applying this reasoning to Smith, he explained:
Recognizing the merit in both positions, it is my opinion that the doubt should
be resolved in favor of permitting the people to vote on the matter. Courts should
not restrict the people from expressing their views through the ballot, except in
those cases in which the questions presented are clearly prohibited by the Constitution.
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and most of Smith's other arguments in a brief footnote, describing
them as "without merit and not sufficient to warrant discussion in
the time we have available.""" Instead, the majority opinion focused
solely on whether the suggested amendment conformed with article
XI, section 1 of the Florida Constitution, which specifies the manner
in which the legislature may propose constitutional amendments. 10 0
"[W]e approach the subject matter of [this] case," the court explained, "mindful of our limited role in reviewing constitutional proposals which have been adopted by the Legislature for direct submission to the people."'' The court acknowledged that the argument for
placing the amendment on the ballot seemed to request a judicial rewriting of article XI, section 1, for it implied that the legislature could
"disguise" an article revision or a rewrite of the entire constitution
"as a mere section amendment" simply because the legislature was
constitutionally authorized to employ all three of those means of
proposing constitutional change.0 2 The court stressed the necessity
for "germanity" in placing amendments in the constitution. 0 3 The
majority agreed that the proposed amendment had only "the barest
margin of relevance" to the constitutional section to which it would
be added. 0 4 In fact, the passage of the joint resolution proposing the
amendment reached "the outer limits of legislative authority conferred by the people . . . ."105
But the court concluded that the proposed amendment was indeed an "amendment" and not a "revision," despite Smith's allegations.10 6 And, however bare the margin of relevance, the proposal
nevertheless had "some connection, albeit tenuous" to the constitutional section it would have amended. 0°' There was "doubt" as to
whether the legislature had exceeded its constitutional powers. 08 And,
since there was doubt, the court felt "compelled to sustain this legisla-

Id. Justice Boyd conceded that the language of the proposed amendment was "vague
and ambiguous" and would "require subsequent judicial interpretation" if adopted. Id.
Even so, he concluded, "The inherent right of the people to adopt amendments to the
Constitution permit [sic] them to adopt vague and ambiguous amendments, as well as
those which are easily understood." Id.
99. 338 So. 2d at 827 n.2.
100. Id. at 827.
101. Id. at 826.
102. Id. at 828.
103. Id. at 830.
104. Id. at 829.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 827.
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tive action" and place the administrative procedures amendment on
10 9
the November ballot.
The opinion in Smathers v. Smith could almost have been written
to affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Despite the absence of any
consideration of the separation of powers issue, virtually every paragraph of the opinion alluded to what Justice England described more
than once as the "faults" of the defendant's case. 10 The court appeared
to differ with Smith, not in his indictment of the proposed amendment, but only in his conclusion that it should be barred from the
ballot. The court discussed in great detail the procedure that the
legislature should follow in proposing an amendment to the state
constitution. Repeatedly, the justices implied that the legislative enactment of the administrative procedures amendment fell short of the
proper procedure. Ultimately, however, the court felt "obliged" to
permit a popular vote on the issue."'
IV.

THE PRECEDENTS

The decision in Smathers v. Smith cannot be understood without
an awareness of the pressures of time which weighed on the court. "A
decision from this court must be rendered promptly," the majority
1 12
noted, "or the machinery of government will be seriously impaired."
The decision must also be viewed amid the volatile political pressures
which surrounded the case. And surely it cannot be understood without
an awareness of the pressures of precedent. Precedent shaped the
rhetoric of the Smith court. Precedent provided the guidelines for the
court's decision.
There is conflicting precedent in Florida where legislative efforts
to amend the state constitution are concerned. Competing maxims are
at war in the case law. Some of these maxims stress the need for a
judicial policy of cautious tolerance toward legislative proposals for
constitutional change. Others emphasize the necessity for an assertive
and aggressive court which will protect the electorate from legislative
excesses in making such proposals. These maxims, of course, reflect
competing judicial philosophies. And the past expressions of those
philosophies were available to the Smith court in the language of
previous judicial opinions-for reassurance, for rationalization, for
justification, and for window dressing.
One such expression was made by Justice Terrell in 1956 when
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.at 828.
Id.at831.
Id. at 827 n.2.
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an earlier constitutional amendment was proposed by the legislature
and came before the Supreme Court:
[W]e should keep in mind ... that we are dealing with a constitutional democracy in which sovereignty resides in the people. It is
their Constitution that we are construing. They have a right to
change, abrogate or modify it in any manner they see fit so long as
they keep within the confines of the Federal Constitution. The legislature which approved and submitted the proposed amendment
took the same oath to protect and defend the Constitution that we
did and our first duty is to uphold their action if there is any reasonable theory under which it can be done. This is the first rule we are
required to observe when considering acts of the legislature and
it is even more impelling when considering a proposed constitutional amendment which goes to the people for their approval or
disapproval. 11
1 4
Justice England quoted this admonition at the outset in Smith.
Undoubtedly, he sought to convey the court's awareness of the need
for judicial restraint in reviewing the actions of the legislature. This
was the framework the court used to justify its decision to limit the
discussion in Smith to whether the proposed amendment complied
with the procedures set forth in article XI, section 1. And this narrow
notion of the judicial role in the amendatory process was mirrored in
the Smith decision.
Yet Justice Terrell, who pleaded so eloquently for judicial restraint,
also argued on occasion for judicial scrutiny of legislative actions. "The
constitution is the people's document," he explained."5 "They may
bind the legislature within the confines of democratic polity, but the
legislature can limit the people only in the manner authorized by
the Constitution."1 "" Justice Terrell reminded lawmakers that sovereignty resides in the people, not the legislature." 7 The legislature
must never overlook "its function of preparing something for the

113. Gray v. Golden, 89 So. 2d 785, 790 (Fla. 1956). The case involved a legislative
proposal to provide home rule for Dade County. The Golden court reversed a trial
court decision which would have kept the issue off the referendum ballot. At issue
was whether the proposed amendment consisted of "more than one" revised article. Id.
at 789. The court held that the amendment had a "single purpose" and did not violate
the "one article" rule. Id.
114. 338 So. 2d at 826-27.
115. Rivera-Cruz v. Gray. 104 So. 2d 501, 506 (Fla. 1958) (special concurring opinion).
The court held that a legislative proposal to revise the constitution by means of interlocking amendments could not be submitted to the electorate.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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people to consider and set itself up as the real constitution maker." '
This advice, however, was not repeated by the Smith court.
Where constitutional amendments are at issue, the constitutional
restraints on the judiciary have fostered an understandable inclination simply to let the people resolve controversial issues at the polls.
Often this is the most expedient choice the court can make in the
circumstances. It is a choice which may be defended with the lofty
words of earlier courts. As Justice Ellis once said, "The opportunity
should be afforded the people, with the least amount of technical departmental obstructions consistent with the letter and spirit of the
constitutional provisions on the subject, to express their desire as to
a supposedly needed change in the Constitution."' 1119
But equally lofty judicial sentiments can be cited to justify an
assertion of the power of the court against the legislature. As Justice
Thornal wrote in 1970:
It would be easy to [transfer] to the electorate the burden of making
our decisions on an idealistic pronouncement 'to let the people
decide.' This, however, is not, in my view, the fulfillment of our
judicial responsibility. It is often much more difficult . .. to take
a stand and 'do the people's will' when the responsibility is clearly
120
ours under the law.
To be sure, these prevailing and countervailing maxims reveal
relatively little about the decisionmaking process of the court. They
offer hardly a clue to why the court would choose one aphorism over
another in a given case. In any perusal of a proposed constitutional
amendment, the nature of the amendment and the nature of the court
will undoubtedly be far more determinative of the eventual outcome
than the nuances of previous judicial opinions. All the same, there
are some rules which are well settled and on which all the justices
would likely agree.
It is generally understood that the court's first duty is to uphold
the action of the legislature if there is any rational theory under which
it can be done. 12' 1 This is especially true with proposed constitutional

118. Id.
119. Collier v. Gray, 157 So. 40, 45 (Fla. 1934). This case involved a citizen's suit to
keep the Secretary of State from placing an amendment on the referendum ballot to reapportion and reduce the number of state judicial circuits. The trial court denied the
injunction, and the supreme court affirmed.
120. Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824, 832 (Fla. 1970) (concurring opinion) (emphasis
in original).
121. Gray v. Golden, 89 So. 2d 785, 790 (Fla. 1956).
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amendments."2 The court should not interfere with the right of the
people to vote on the proposal unless the constitutional amendment
proposed by the legislature is "clearly and conclusively defective.' 1 23
Above all, the court should not consider the substance of the suggested
amendment when making its decision. 2 4 Procedure alone is subject
to judicial review. Yet the court must be mindful of its constant
1 25
responsibility to preserve the integrity of the constitution.
There is precedent to the effect that "[m]ere formal or procedural
irregularities in the framing, manner, or form of submission or balloting" should not keep a constitutional amendment proposed by the
legislature off the referendum ballot.

26

In Landis v. Thompson,' 27 the

court offered that as an explanation for its holding that an amendment
which reapportioned and reduced the number of judicial circuits in
the state was constitutionally adopted. 28

But the amendment in

122. Id.
123. Goldner v. Adams, 167 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1964). In Goldner, the court noted
that "[h]istorically, this Court has declined to interfere with the right of the electorate
to act upon a proposed constitutional amendment absent a clear showing that the proposal contravenes existing controlling organic prescriptions." Id. Similarly, in Gray v.
Moss, 156 So. 262, 264 (Fla. 1934), the court held that
[i]f a duly proposed amendment to the state Constitution does not in terms so
plainly, palpably, and inevitably violate some command or limitation of the Federal
Constitution as to make the text of the proposed amendment necessarily void as
an entirety, its submission to the voters should not be enjoined ....
The court has held that "[t]he general rule is that the Legislature is supreme in the
legislative field, which is the most powerful branch of government, so long as it does
not violate any of the provisions of the organic law." Davis v. City of Stuart, 120 So.
335, 346 (Fla. 1929) (emphasis in original). Likewise, "[tihe elector should not be deprived of his vote through mere inference, but only upon the clear expression of the
law." Law v. Saxon, 12 So. 218, 224 (Fla. 1892).
124. "It is not for the courts to determine what is a wise proposed amendment or
what is an unwise one. With the wisdom of the policy the courts have nothing to do."
Gray v. Childs, 156 So. 274, 279 (Fla. 1934). "Neither the wisdom of the provision nor
the quality of the draftsmanship is a matter for our review." Weber v. Smathers, 338
So. 2d 819, 822 (Fla. 1976). "Courts are never permitted to strike down an act of the
Legislature because it fails to square with their individual social or economic theories
or what they deem to be sound public policy." Ball v. Branch, 16 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla.
1944).
125. "[I]t is the duty of the courts, when called upon so to do, to determine whether
or not the procedure attempted to be adopted is that which is required by the terms
of the organic law." Gray v. Childs, 156 So. 274, 279 (Fla. 1934).
126. Landis v. Thompson, 163 So. 270, 276 (Fla. 1935).
127. 163 So. 270 (Fla. 1935).
128. Id. at 276. The Thompson court relied on West v. State, 39 So. 412, 414-15 (Fla.
1905), in which the court held that
where a proposed amendment to the Constitution receives the affirmative votes of
three-fifths of all the members elected to each house, and such proposed amendment is published and submitted to the vote of the people as required, and at
the election is approved and adopted by a majority of the votes of the people
cast thereon, then it becomes a valid part of the organic law . ...
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Thompson was not subjected to the consideration of the court until
after it was approved by the people. Whatever formal defects there
may have been in that amendment were cured by its ratification. So
Thompson can be distinguished from Smith. Yet even the Thompson
court stressed that "[i]t is . . . required by the Constitution that the
formal act of agreeing to and submitting to the people each proposed
amendment shall be in every respect done in conformity to the requirements ... of the Constitution . . .
In Thompson, the court declared that judicial determination of
whether the legislature complied with the constitution in proposing
an amendment is proper "only before constitutional amendments have
-130 And jubeen actually advertised, submitted, and voted on ....
dicial scrutiny is necessary then "only because of the right of citizens
of the state to have the constitutional formalities observed . .. ."Is,
The Thompson court concluded that "the citizens are entitled to have
their constitution remain sacrosanct, unaltered, and untampered with,
until such time as the Legislature shall . . . bring about such change
in strict conformity to the essential requirements of their organic
compact."' 1 2
The holding in Thompson has been followed in subsequent decisions of the court. 3 3 In Pearson v. Taylor,13 for example, the court
reiterated in dictum the Thompson rule that procedural defects in
proposed constitutional amendments are "cured by the election
itself." 13 5 However, the Pearson court also stated that "the constitution places a mandatory duty on the legislature to follow certain procedure as a necessary prerequisite to bringing about an election to
amend the constitution .... .136 The court declared that the failure
In West, the proposed amendment allegedly was not entered correctly in the legislative
journals. West v. State, 39 So. at 415. In Thompson, the petitioner alleged, among other
things, that the amendment revised more than one constitutional section, that the substance of the amendment was not placed on the ballot, and that the joint resolution
proposing the amendment was passed after the legislative session ended. Thompson v.
State, 163 So. at 273.
129. 163 So. at 277.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Revels v. De Goyler, 33 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1948) (holding that a slight
variation in the wording of the House and Senate versions of the amendment which
created the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission was cured by election;
Sylvester v. Tindall, 18 So. 2d 892, 896 (Fla. 1944) (holding that "if there was any
irregularity" in an amendment creating the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission it was cured by adoption at the polls).
134. 32 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1947).
135. Id. at 827. Pearson involved defects in a local option election on the sale
of intoxicating liquors.
136. Id.
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to follow prescribed procedures was "fatal if raised before the election." 3 7
The suit in Smith was brought nearly two months before the election. Yet whatever defects there may have been in the administrative
procedures amendment proved far from fatal before the supreme court.
The Smith court was apparently tempted to affirm the circuit court
judgment and keep the amendment off the ballot. But the court chose
instead "to let the people decide.'

13

And, however reluctant the

majority may have seemed in reaching this conclusion, it was ostensibly
founded on a shared belief that the legislature had met at least the
minimum requirements of article XI, section 1 of the Florida Constitution in proposing the amendment.
Moreover, the Smith court must have reached its decision after
assessing, not only how it would affect article XI, section 1, but also
how it would affect all of article XI. For in construing any single
constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of Florida must consider
the document as a whole to fulfill the overall constitutional purpose. 13 9
"This fundamental rule of construction," the Smith court stated,
"directs that we consider the four methods of modifying the Constitution in a way which will harmonize them rather than distort them."140
The four methods of constitutional modification are detailed in
article XI.14 ' First, the people may, by their own initiative, amend

any "portion or portions" of the constitution, so long as the amendment confines itself to a single subject.142 This initiative provision was
137. Id.
138. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
139. Smathers v. Smith, 338 So. 2d at 827. See generally Barrow v. Holland, 125 So. 2d
749 (Fla. 1960); Scarborough v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 8 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1942);
Wheeler v. Neggs, 78 So. 685 (Fla. 1918).
140. 338 So. 2d at 827. And, where modifications are made in the prescribed manner,
there are generally no limits except those presented in the Federal Constitution. Collier
v. Gray, 157 So. at 40.
141. See generally Sturm, supra note 3.
142. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3. This provision was not included in Florida's first five
constitutions. It was new to the 1968 document. The provision was broadened by a
legislatively initiated amendment in 1972, which removed a locational limit on amendments by popular initiative to "any section" of the constitution. This amendment was
inspired by the supreme court's rejection of the initiative petition for a unicameral
legislature in Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1970). Article XI, section 3 now
provides:
The power to propose the revision or amendment of any portion or portions
of this constitution by initiative is reserved to the people, provided that, any
such revision or amendment shall embrace but one subject and matter directly
connected therewith. It may be invoked by filing with the secretary of state a
petition containing a copy of the proposed revision or amendment, signed by a
number of electors in each of one half of the congressional districts of the state,
and of the state as a whole, equal to eight percent of the votes cast in each of
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employed successfully for the first time in 1976 when the voters approved the "Sunshine Amendment. ' ' 14 3 Second, the people have approved the intermittent convening of a constitution revision commission to propose a "revision" of the constitution or any part of the
constitution for submission to the electorate. 44 This provision is now
being used for the first time.1' 5 Third, the people have reserved
the power to call a constitutional convention to consider a revision
of the "entire" constitution. 14 This provision has not been used, nor
147
does it seem likely that it will be used in the foreseeable future.
such districts respectively and in the state as a whole in the last preceding election in which presidential electors were chosen.
143. See note 40 supra. The "Sunshine Amendment" is now article II, section 8 of
the constitution.
144. FLA. CoNsT. art. XI, § 2. This section provides that a constitution revision
commission shall be established "[w]ithin thirty days after the adjournment of the
regular session of the legislature convened in the tenth year following that in which
the constitution is adopted, and each twentieth year thereafter ... ." Id.
145. In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor Request of Nov. 19, 1976 (Constitution Revision Commission), 343 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1977). See note I supra.
146. FsA. CONST. art. XI, § 4 provides:
(a) The power to call a convention to consider a revision of the entire
constitution is reserved to the people. It may be invoked by filing with the secretary of state a petition, containing a declaration that a constitutional convention
is desired, signed by a number of electors in each of one-half of the congressional
districts of the state, and of the state as a whole, equal to fifteen percent of the
vote cast in each such district respectively and in the state as a whole in the
last preceding election of presidential electors.
(b) At the next general election held more than ninety days after the filing
of such petition there shall be submitted to the electors of the state the question: "Shall a constitutional convention be held?" If a majority voting on the
question votes in the affirmative, at the next succeeding general election there
shall be elected from each representative district a member of a constitutional
convention. On the twenty-first day following that election, the convention shall
sit at the capital, elect officers, adopt rules of procedure, judge the election of
its membership, and fix a time and place for its future meetings. Not later than
ninety days before the next succeeding general election, the convention shall
cause to be filed with the secretary of state any revision of this constitution,
proposed by it.
147. The obstacles to calling a constitutional convention are even more imposing
than those for placing a constitutional amendment on the ballot by the initiative.
Currently, a convention can be called only by collection of signatures from "a number
of electors in each of one half of the congressional districts of the state, and of the
state as a whole, equal to fifteen percent of the votes cast in each such district respectively and in the state as a whole in the last preceding election of presidential electors."
FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 4. See note 146 supra. In the aftermath of his experience with
the "Sunshine Amendment" campaign, Governor Askew said he would seek some
unspecified modifications in the initiative provision as a part of constitutional revision
to make it somewhat easier to place initiatives on the ballot. Miami Herald, July 30,
1976, at 1-A, col. 3. An unsuccessful resolution introduced by Representative George
Hieber of St. Petersburg in the 1977 legislative session proposed an amendment to
section 3 which would have reduced the number of signatures required for an initiative
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Finally, the most significant and the most often used means of
constitutional change in Florida is through proposals by the legislature. 148 At issue in Smith was article XI, section 1, which provides:

Amendment of a section or revision of one or more articles, or the
whole, of this constitution may be proposed by joint resolution
agreed to by three-fifths of the membership of each house of the
legislature. The full text of the joint resolution and the vote of each
member voting shall be entered on the journal of each house.
Adopted in 1968, this provision resembles its counterpart in the
1885 constitution. 14 9 To the extent that the two sections are identical,

the judicial constructions of the 1885 provision should apply as well
to article XI, section 1.150 Thus, the constitution clearly contemplates
that proposed amendments shall be agreed to by a deliberate, final,
and affirmative vote of the required numbers in each house.151 Liketo six percent of the votes cast in the state as a whole in the preceding presidential
election. Fla. H.R.J. Res. 1628 (1977). However, neither the Governor nor anyone else
has suggested easing the even more stringent requirements for summoning a constitutional
convention.
148. For example, eight of the nine amendments on the referendum ballot in 1976
were proposed by the legislature. Records in the Division of Elections, Office of the
Secretary of State, Tallahassee, Florida. The ninth was the "Sunshine Amendment." Id.
149. Article XVII, section 1 of the 1885 constitution provided:
Either branch of the Legislature, at any regular session, or at any special or
extraordinary session thereof called for such purpose either in the governor's
original call or any amendment thereof, may propose the revision or amendment of any portion or portions of this Constitution. Any such revision or amendment may relate to one subject or any number of subjects, but no amendment
shall consist of more than one revised article of the Constitution.
If the proposed revision or amendment is agreed to by three-fifths of the
members elected to each house, it shall be entered upon their respective journals
with the yeas and nays and published in one newspaper in each county where a
newspaper is published for two times, one publication to be made not earlier
than ten weeks and the other not later than six weeks, immediately preceding
the election at which the same is to be voted upon, and thereupon submitted to
the electors of the state for approval or rejection at the next general election,
provided, however, that such revision or amendment may be submitted for approval
or rejection in a special election under the conditions described in and in the
manner provided by Section 3 of Article XVII of this Constitution. If a majority
of the electors voting upon the amendment adopt such amendment the same shall
become a part of this Constitution.
150. When a provision in the present constitution closely follows those in the
previous constitutions, cases interpreting the old constitution remain valid as interpretations of the new document. The theory is that the framers were familiar with the old
case law and sought to preserve it. See, e.g., Hayek v. Lee County, 231 So. 2d 214 (Fla.
1970); Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 112 So. 2d 843 (Fla., 1959).
151. Crawford v. Gilchrist, 59 So. 963 (Fla. 1912) (holding that a vote in the
Senate was duly reconsidered and a proposed amendment was not finally agreed to by
the members of the Senate).
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wise, procedural rules for acting on such proposals may be adopted
and employed by each house if they are not in conflict with the
constitution. 152 Furthermore, the legislative power to propose constitutional changes includes the right to reconsider action taken on an
153
amendment when no constitutional provision is violated.
The legislative authority in article XI is not limited in the same
ways as the legislative authority in article III.54 The act of proposing
constitutional amendments is not perceived as an ordinary legislative
function. 15 5 Such proposals are not subject to the constitutional provisions regulating the introduction and passage of ordinary legislative
enactments. 5 ' For instance, "[t]he constitutional requirements that
bills shall be read on different days or at different times do not
apply. ' ' 157 And, while a proposal to change the constitution may have
a title, it is not required.'" Perhaps most important, the Governor's
59
approval is not required.1
Before Smith, the only construction by the supreme court of
article XI was in 1970 in Adams v. Gunter.-o In Gunter, a declaratory
judgment was sought by State Senator Bill Gunter to determine the
validity of an initiative petition which he planned to circulate proposing a constitutional amendment to create a unicameral legislature.
The Orange County Circuit Court upheld the petition, and Secretary
of State Tom Adams appealed. The supreme court reversed the lower
court and held that the petition was defective because it would have
affected several other provisions of the constitution besides article III,
section 1, which provides for a bicameral legislature.' 6'
The court's decision in Gunter involved the popular initiative
provision of article XI, section 3 and not the legislative amendment
provision of article XI, section 1, which was construed in Smith. However, the reasoning employed by the Gunter court is pertinent to construction of section 1. The power of the legislature to propose constitutional amendments is restricted by section 1, which states that the
legislature may offer either an "amendment" to a "section" of the
152. Collier v. Gray, 157 So. 40, 45 (Fla. 1934).
153. Crawford v. Gilchrist, 59 So. 963 (Fla. 1912).
154. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § § 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8.
155. Collier v. Gray, 157 So. 40, 44 (Fla. 1934).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. "Whenever a title is used, it is for identification, verification, and convenience and may be considered on interpretation of the amendment." Id.
159. Id. at 45.
160. 238 So. 2d 824 (Fla.1970).
161. Senator Gunter then abandoned his campaign for a unicameral legislature
rather than circulate a series of initiative amendments for signatures. The issue was
never placed before the electorate.
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constitution or a "revision" of "one or more articles, or the whole." 162
The distinctions between an "amendment" and a "revision" have
been of some importance to the supreme court over the years, and
these distinctions were discussed at length by the Gunter court. As
Justice Drew explained for the majority in Gunter,
[t]he Constitution is divided into twelve Articles and each
Article is divided into numbered sections. Throughout Article XI
the words "amendment" and "revision" are used to denote entirely different things. The words were carefully and deliberately
selected and it is clear from the language of Article XI that the
people have reserved the right to bring about an amendment to
any section of the Constitution by following the provisions set forth
therein. The people have also reserved unto themselves the power
to bring about a complete revision of the entire Constitution. It is
equally clear from Article XI that where more than one section of
the Constitution is to be amended it is called a revision, and such
revision contemplates deliberative action ... in order to accomplish
harmony in language and purpose between articles and to produce
as nearly as possible a document free of doubts and inconsistencies. 63
The Gunter court endorsed an observation by the Supreme Court
of California that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is "not merely between two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and between their respective fields of application. ' ' 164 Whether one or the other procedure should be used depends
essentially on how much change is envisioned in the constitution. Concurring in Gunter, Justice Thornal wrote that the initiative provision
had "obviously been so cautiously drawn in order to avoid accomplishing extremely far-reaching changes in the organic law without notice
or warning in the proposal which was being acted upon."' 165 The same
might be said about article XI, section 1.
Two years after the Gunter decision, "the people of Florida made
it clear that they no longer wanted their initiative rights confined in
,,16' They removed the locational limit
the 1968 straight jacket ....
which restricted amendment by popular initiative to "any section" of
the constitution. Instead, they adopted the current version of section 3,
which allows initiative amendments of "any portion or portions" of

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
238 So. 2d at 829 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 831, quoting McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P. 2d 787, 797 (Cal. 1948).
238 So. 2d at 833 (concurring opinion).
Weber v. Smathers, 338 So. 2d 819, 823 (Fla. 1976).
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the constitution. 1 7 But the locational limitations imposed on the legislature by section 1 have not been changed by a vote of the people.
The distinction between "amendment" and "revision" has long
been a part of constitutional construction in Florida. The constitution of 1868 provided for separate methods of amending and revising
the constitution.1 6s A 1948 amendment to the constitution of 1885,
the immediate predecessor of the state's current charter, restricted
amendments to a single "article."169 There are no cases construing the
meaning of the reference to "section" in article XI, section 1. But the
Gunter court said that a reference to "section" in the 1968 constitution
was "decidedly analogous" to a reference to "article" in the 1885
constitution, which provided in part that "no amendment shall con1 70
Therefore,
sist of more than one revised article of the Constitution.the "one section" reference in article XI, section 1 of the present
constitution would seem to be "decidedly analogous" to, the "one
article" limitation which was imposed on the 1885 constitution by
popular amendment in 1948.
Before the enactment of the 1968 constitution, the Supreme Court
of Florida discussed this "one article" rule at some length in Gray v.
167. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; see note 142 supra.
168. FLA. CONST. art. XVII, H9 1, 2 (1868). Section 1 required that constitutional
amendments be proposed by two-thirds of the membership of both houses of the
legislature for two consecutive sessions before they could be placed on the ballot. At
that time, regular legislative sessions were held once every two years. Section 2 provided
for constitutional revision at a convention called at the initiative of the legislature.
The 1868 constitution was the fourth of six constitutions for the State of Florida.
The 1861 and 1865 constitutions prohibited amendments except by convention. FLA.
CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1, 2 (1861); FLA. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1-3 (1865). Like the 1868
document, the 1838 constitution required two separate votes. First, the approval of twothirds of each house of what was then a "general assembly" was required at least six
months prior to the election of a new "general assembly." Then the proposed amendment had to be submitted to the new "general assembly" and, if again approved by twothirds of the membership of both houses, it was submitted to the people for a vote. FLA.
CONsT. art. XIV, §§ 1, 2 (1838). See Sturm, supra note 3.
169. FLA. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (1885). The 1885 constitution was somewhat inconsistent on the amendment process. Article XVII, section 1, as amended in 1948 provided that amendments could be introduced by joint resolution to propose either a
revision or an amendment of any portion or portions of the constitution-so long as
the amendment did not cover more than one article of the constitution. Before it was
amended in 1948, section 1 merely provided for the offering of amendments without
indicating whether or not they could relate to more than one section or article.
Article XVII, section 4, as amended in 1964, provided that, as an "additional
method" of revising the entire constitution, the legislature could propose either amendments or a revision to the entire document or a revision or amendments of any portion or portions. This was the vehicle actually used to avoid the earlier limitations of
section 1 of article XVII and adopt the current constitution in 1968. See 26A FLA. STAT.
ANN. 539-40, Comment (1970).
170. FLA. CONST. art XVII, § 1 (1885) (emphasis supplied).
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Golden. 1 Speaking for the Golden court, Justice Terrell stated that
the applicable test was whether there was a "unity of purpose" in
2
the proposed amendment. He recalled City of Coral Gables v. Gray,1
in which,
we took pains to relate that even though a proposed amendment
may be separable into two or more propositions concerning the
value of which diversity of opinion may arise, that alone is not
sufficient to condemn it; provided, the propositions may be logically
viewed as having a natural relation and connection as component
parts or aspects of a single dominant purpose. Unity of purpose as
revealed in the object sought by the amendment is the test; the
details leading to it are not material1 73
The absence of any "unity of purpose" thwarted a legislative
effort to revise the 1885 constitution in 1958 by submitting a series
of interlocking "daisy chain" amendments to the electorate. In RiveraCruz v. Gray,174 the supreme court removed the amendments from the
ballot. The amendments before the Rivera-Cruz court were in the
form of fourteen joint legislative resolutions which would have revised
171. 89 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1956).
172. 19 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1944).
173. 89 So. 2d at 788. (emphasis supplied). City of Coral Gables involved a suit to
remove from the ballot an amendment which would have established home rule in
Dade and Orange counties. City of Coral Gables v. Gray, 19 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1944). The
trial court granted a motion to dismiss the suit. The supreme court reversed, removing
the amendment from the ballot. Speaking for the City of Coral Gables court, Justice
Sebring said that "if a proposed amendment has but one main purpose and object in
view and all else included therein is incidental thereto, . . . it is not susceptible to the
charge that it contains more than one amendment." Id. at 320. To constitute more than
one amendment, the legislative proposal
must not only relate to more than one subject but also have at least two separate
and distinct purposes not dependent upon or connected with each other. And
even though an amendment embrace more than one subject, said subjects need
not be separately submitted to the electors, if they are so connected with or dependent upon the general subject that it might be undesirable that one be
adopted and not the other.
Id.
Justice Sebring said that an amendment may be acceptable even though "capable of
separation into two or more propositions," so long as it has "a single dominant plan or
scheme." Id. "Unity of object and plan is the universal test," the City of Coral Gables
court decided, "and it is to be looked for in the ultimate end sought, not in the
details or steps leading to the end." Id. Consequently,
[i]t is only when, in the light of common sense, several propositions are submitted
as one and have to do with different subjects which are so essentially unrelated
that their association is purely artificial, that they are not one within the constitutional mandate, for then the unity of object and purpose is not there, no matter
in what form the proposal may be framed.
Id. (citations omitted).
174. 104 So. 2d 501 (Fla, 1958).
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the entire 1885 constitution except for one article. None of the fourteen
proposed amendments would have become effective unless all were
approved. 175 Hence, the term "daisy chain" was used to describe them.
Once again, the issue was whether the proposed changes were
merely "amendments" or a full-fledged "revision." The Rivera-Cruz
court acknowledged the "practicability. . . of linking them together."'7 6
But the court warned that "practicalities cannot, however sound, justify
a circumvention of a provision of the Constitution .
,,177 Moreover,
"..
"[i]f the changes attempted are so sweeping that it is necessary to
include the provisions interlocking them, then it is plain that the
plan would constitute a recasting of the whole Constitution ....
"178
The Rivera-Cruz court held that the fourteen joint resolutions
amounted to a revision of the constitution. And, since the proper revision procedure had not been followed by the legislature,'17 9 the "daisy
chain" could not be placed on the ballot. The two methods of changing
' 80
the constitution, the court declared, "may not be intermingled.'
There are "underlying fundamental principles of amendment and revision" which must be followed.' 8 ' And these principles "are so unrelated that they cannot be blended .... .182
According to the Rivera-Cruz court, the purpose of the rule limiting amendments to a single constitutional section "is to permit an
elector to vote intelligently for the amendments he favors and against
the ones he disapproves."1' 83 Or, as Justice Terrell summarized the issue
in his concurring opinion, "the word 'revision' relates to the whole in-

strument.' ' "8 4 Thus, the "underlying fundamental principles of amendment and revision"''8 s defended in Rivera-Cruz are founded on addi175. As the Rivera-Cruz court explained:
In each of the resolutions it is provided that the particular amendment embedded
in it shall not be effective unless all amendments, of the preamble and all articles
except Article V, are approved by a majority of the votes cast. In the briefs
and in the decree this arrangement is called the 'daisy chain' system.
104 So. 2d at 503.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. The proper procedure for revision at the time would have been to call for a
constitutional convention as provided in article XVII, section 2 of the 1885 Constitution.
Id.
180. Id. at 502. A fifteenth amendment proposed at the same time as the fourteen
amendments condemned in Rivera-Cruz was allowed to remain on the ballot because it
"was not tied to the other amendments." Pope v. Gray, 104 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. 1958).
181. 104 So. 2d at 504.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 505.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 504.
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tional underlying principles of notice. In brief, an amendment must
be labeled as an amendment and a revision must be labeled as a revision to assure intelligent and knowledgeable voting at the polls.
This same issue faced the court in a companion case to Smith,
Weber v. Smathers.186 Shortly after Smith filed his suit against the administrative procedures amendment, a former member of the state
senate, Charles Weber, challenged the constitutionality of the "Sunshine Amendment.'

18 7

A campaign by Governor Askew to place a

strong ethics provision in the constitution through use of the popular
initiative had generated more than 220,000 signatures from Florida
voters. 8 The Secretary of State certified that these signatures met the
test for an initiative proposal which is outlined in article XI, section
3.119 However, Weber maintained that the initiative proposal circulated

by the Governor embraced "more than one subject" and would "revise
several articles other than the one it purportedly amends."'190
Weber's suit was dismissed with prejudice in circuit court. 19' The
supreme court affirmed this dismissal in Weber on the same day that
it reversed the circuit court decision in Smith. 92 Chief Justice Overton wrote the majority opinion in Weber, and Justice Roberts offered
the only dissent.' 93 The majority distinguished the Weber suit from
both the petition for a unicameral legislature in Gunter and the "daisy
chain" amendments in Rivera-Cruz. The Weber court held that, unlike
those earlier proposals, the "Sunshine Amendment" was "sufficiently
complete within itself, requiring no other amendment to effect its
purpose.'

194

Furthermore, the provisions of the initiative proposal

were "sufficiently related to withstand an attack that they embrace
more than one subject."' 19 5 And, if adopted, the proposed amendment

would "not conflict with other articles and sections of the Constitu186. 338 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1976).
187. Id. at 821. Weber's suit was filed in Leon County Circuit Court on September
23-two weeks after Smith's suit was filed. Id.
188. Records in the Division of Elections, Office of the Secretary of State, Tallahassee,
Florida.
189. See note 142 supra.
190. 338 So. 2d at 821.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. Justice Roberts denounced the "rapid abandonment of former precedents"
and said he could not distinguish the situation in Weber from that in Gunter. Id. at 824.
"I do not for one moment question the sincerity of the Governor in sponsoring the socalled Sunshine Amendment nor the nobleness of his purpose," he explained. Id. But
Justice Roberts felt that it should be "more difficult" for the people to amend the
constitution through use of the initiative than for the legislature to propose amendments through joint resolutions. Id.
194. Id. at 822.
195. Id.
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tion ... ",190Consequently, the Weber court held that the "Sunshine
Amendment" could not be removed from the ballot.
A concurring opinion by Justice England in Weber may afford
some insight into his remarks for the majority that same day in Smith.
Although in Weber he addressed the initiative provision of article
XI, section 3 and not the legislative amendment provision of section
1, some of what Justice England said in the companion case helps
explain the tolerance he displayed toward the legislature in Smith. In
arguing that the "Sunshine Amendment" should be presented to the
electorate, Justice England interpreted the "one subject" limitation in
section 3 as a "functional, as opposed to locational, restraint on the
range of authorized amendments. ' ' 19 7 He discerned an intention among
the framers of the 1968 constitution "to restrain initiative in a manner
comparable to restraints on the Legislature.-19 8
Justice England offered the novel thesis that the limitation on the
people in article XI, section 3 parallels the limitation on the legislature
in article III, section 6, which states that laws developed in the legislature "shall embrace but one subject." 199 He saw "no justification for a
differentiation" between these similar constitutional sections. 00 Then,
noting the "gloss aplenty" that has been attached to article III, section 6
through judicial construction, Justice England implied that he saw
no reason why the same broad construction should not be given to
article XI, section 3.201 "On this basis," he concluded, "I have no
trouble upholding the amendment's concern with 'ethics in govern' ' 20 2
ment' as a single subject suitable for initiative.
Entirely apart from the content of the "Sunshine Amendment"
and the construction of section 3, what Justice England said in Weber
sheds some light on what he and the rest of the court did in Smith.
There is no "one subject" limitation on the constitutional powers of
the legislature to propose constitutional changes under section 1. The
existing limitations on the authority vested in the legislature by section
1. are primarily the product of judicial construction, such as the "unity
of purpose" rule imposed in City of Coral Gables.203 Beyond that,
those seeking to limit the discretion of the legislature to suggest constitutional changes must rely on the locational limitations imposed by
196.
197.
" 198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id. at 823 (concurring opinion).
Id.
Id.
id.
Id.
Id.
See text accompanying note 173 supra.
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section 1 and on the subtle distinctions between an "amendment"
and a "revision."
Smith and Weber probably should be considered together. Many
of the same actors and many similar issues were involved in both cases.
They both involved the overall issue of constitutional change. Without
indulging in undue speculation, it can surely be assumed that the
attitudes of the justices toward one case may have influenced their
thinking about the other. As it was, the court proved willing to allow
the people to vote in both instances.
V.

THE DECISION

The Rivera-Cruz court reminded a legislature seeking substantial
changes in the Florida Constitution that, while "[a]ny process of
changing the Constitution is cumbersome," this was done by the
people "purposely in order that the organic law may not be easily
re-molded [sic] to fit situations and sentiments that are relatively transitory and fleeting."2 ' The plaintiff in Smith perceived such fleeting,
transitory sentiments in the legislative effort to place the administrative
procedures amendment on the referendum ballot. It may not have been
a "daisy chain," but the amendment proposed by CS/SJR 619/1398
seemed to Smith to be just as much a "circumvention of a provision
of the constitution.

' ' 205

Smith portrayed the amendment on appeal as an agent of "disharmony" and a harbinger of "serious doubts and inconsistencies."206
He reiterated the allegations he had made in circuit court. 0 7 He said
the administrative procedures amendment was a "revision" and not
an "amendment" to the Florida Constitution.2 0

8

And, should it be

adopted by the people, Smith believed that no less than six separate
and additional amendments would then, by implication, "be required
to accomplish the purpose of the proposed amendment."

' 20

9

204. 104 So. 2d at 503.
205. Brief for Appellee at 15.
206. Id. at 10-11.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 16.
209. Id. at 11-14. Smith anticipated two needed amendments to article V which
would restrict the historical power of the judiciary. "The all-encompassing statement
that the judicial power shall be vested in the courts would no longer be accurate," he
claimed. Id. at 11. Also, the constitutional power granted to the judiciary by article V,
sections 3(b), 4(b), and 5(b) to review administrative action directly would be limited
by the powers which would be conferred on the legislature by the proposed amendment. Id. (Smith did not mention that this type of judicial review is limited to the
manner prescribed by law.) In addition, he said article I, section 21 would have to be
amended to limit access to the courts for the redress of injury. Id. at 12 (Smith also did
not mention the existing limitations on that section).
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In his brief, the Secre-

tary of State pointed out that both Gunter and Rivera-Cruz had involved express efforts to amend more than one section of the constitution. 211 There were no such express efforts attached to the administra-

tive procedures amendment, which, according to Smathers, was
"singular and complete within itself, and require[d] no further express
amendments to become effective."

212

The Secretary of State maintained that the implied effects of the
administrative procedures amendment on other constitutional provisions were "either minimal or non-existent." 2 1" Relying on Golden
and City of Coral Gables, he also argued that "implied effects upon
other portions of the Constitution are irrelevant to the question of
whether more than one section is involved as long as those implied
effects are germane to the single dominant purpose of the amendment. ' 2' 1

Therefore, he concluded, the legislative proposal was an

"amendment" and not a "revision.."215 In any event, Smathers added,
the legislature is granted express authority by article XI, section 1
either to amend or to revise the constitution, as it chooses.2 1 6 Thus,
the appellant argued that the distinction between "amendment" and
"revision" was irrelevant to the case.21 7

To all this, Smith replied that the distinction was both relevant
and essential. Smathers' efforts to distinguish the administrative procedures amendment from the proposals in Gunter and Rivera-Cruz
resulted, Smith claimed, only in "a distinction without a difference."21 8
"The fatal defect in this case," Smith argued,

Furthermore, Smith claimed article III, section 1 would have to be changed to
reflect the role a legislative committee could play in exercising powers traditionally
reserved to the whole legislature. Id. at 12-13. And he envisioned a need to amend
article IV, section l(b) to restrict the power of the Governor to initiate judicial proceedings in the name of the state against any executive or administrative officer to
enforce compliance with any duty or restrain any unauthorized act. Id. at 13. Finally,
he said the provision addressed by the proposed amendment itself, article I, section 18,
would have to be further amended, at least in title, to reflect the proposed addition.
Id. at 12.
210. Brief for Appellant.
211. Id. at 17.
212. Id. at 17-18.
213. Id. at 29.
214. Id. at 24.
215. Id. at 28.
216. Id. at 33 (emphasis in original).
217. "The Legislature now has full authority to propose amendments and revisions
by joint resolution, and thus the distinction is not relevant to the question whether
Senate Joint Resolution 619 and 1398 originated in the proper manner." Id.
218. Brief for Appellee at 15.
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is not that the legislature could not have proposed a revision had it
put its mind to it, but that it did not bother, and attempted instead to accomplish by amendment that which could have only been
accomplished by a revision which directly addressed each affected
219
section, and changed each so as to produce a harmonious whole.
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the Secretary of State.
The distinction between an "amendment" and a "revision," the
Smith court observed, "shows . . . our great reluctance to write out
or blur distinctive constitutional terminology. ' ' 22 However, the court
concluded, "[t]he distinction between an 'amendment' and a 'revision'
. . . is not critical here. ' 221
,
Yet, having reached this conclusion, the
court then went on to discuss that distinction at considerable length.
"The function of a section amendment," the court reasoned, "is to
alter, modify or change the substance of a single section of the Constitution containing particularized statements of organic law." 222 In contrast, "[t]he function of an article revision is to restructure an entire
class of governmental powers or rights, such as legislative powers,
taxation powers, or individual rights." 22 Consequently,
[w]hen the subject matter being proposed for change goes beyond
or is unrelated to the context of the section it purports to change,
the proposal cannot be a section amendment. It may be an article
revision or a revision of the whole document, but it is not a 'sec224
tion' amendment.
While the supreme court held for Smathers, the justices offered
little encouragement for Smathers' efforts to minimize the significance of the distinctions between an "amendment" and a "revision."
As Justice England remarked:
[I]f an article revision or a rewrite of the whole Constitution could
be characterized, equated with or disguised as a mere section amend219. Id. at 16.
220. 338 So. 2d at 828 n.9. The Smith court also explained: "We have consistently
held that different words in amendatory articles of the Constitution must be read
differently, and each given vitality." Id. at 828. This echoed the longstanding general
rule: "Our view is that we must give effect to the constitution according to what we
deem to be its plain meaning and what the people must have understood it to mean
at the time they adopted it." Advisory Opinion to Governor, 22 So. 2d 398, 399 (Fla.
1945).
221. 338 So. 2d at 828 n.9.
222. Id. at 829 (footnote omitted).
223. Id.
224. Id.
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ment, then the people's deliberate choice of terms is wholly without
significance. Every proposal could be defended as a revision of the
whole Constitution, no matter how narrow its purpose or subject
matter. A fault with the state's suggestion, then, is that it seeks total
nullification of two or three amendment procedures the people have
given to the legislative branch. We, of course, lack judicial authority
to rewrite Section 1 of Article XI as the state seems to request. 225

The Smith decision was not founded on whether the administrative procedures amendment was really an "amendment" to a section
or, instead, a "revision" of one or more articles of the Florida Constitution. The court dismissed that issue, just as it dismissed the plaintiff's
other contentions. But, curiously, after dismissing the distinctions
between "amendment" and "revision" as "not critical" to the case,
the court then used those distinctions to explain the test it chose to
apply. The distinctions between "amendment" and "revision," the
court decided, represent the "minimal requirements for clear expression and locational specificity" which should be fulfilled by the
226
legislature in proposing a constitutional amendment.

"The serious business of amending a constitution by lawmakers
demands that the functional unity of sections and articles be preserved
to the fullest extent possible," Justice England wrote for the Smith
majority. 227 This is necessary "so that, first, ambiguities and contradic' ' 228
tions be avoided and, second, cumulative confusion be prevented.
Justice England said the people of Florida had "recognized the dangers
of mis-amendments" and had endeavored to avoid them by mandating

a periodic review of their constitution by a revision commission.2 2 9
This was done, he declared, in order to keep the 1968 constitution

from becoming like the much-amended 1885 constitution, which "was
fully revised in 1968 principally because a hodgepodge of disharmonious provisions . . . added over the years had made governance

'2 30
complex, expensive and uncertain."
But the time that elapses between revision commissions in Florida
can be measured in decades, and, apart from their power to propose
constitutional revisions, such commissions have no authority at all
over the legislature. Only the courts can check the exercise of the
extensive legislative power to propose constitutional changes. And the

courts can do so only when a citizen and taxpayer challenges the
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 828 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 829.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at n.14.
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legislative prerogative. This rarely happens.2 3' Consequently, the
principal responsibility for keeping the 1968 constitution from becoming another "hodgepodge" which will make governing "complex,
expensive and uncertain" lies with the legislators themselves and, indirectly, with the people who elect them.
So the opportunity presented to the Smith court was indeed an
unusual one. And the court responded by applying an unusual "germanity" test to the challenged amendment.3 2 Above all, the Smith
court seemed concerned with whether the administrative procedures
amendment was "germane" to the constitutional section it would have
amended..2 3 The court divined that a concept of "germanity" was
necessary for constitutional amendments and was "clearly essential"
to harmonize the various parts of the constitution in a way that would
eliminate inconsistencies.2 3 4 "Were this not so," the majority asserted,
"or were Article XI, Section 1 so elastic as to sanction the addition of
wholly unrelated provisions to guarantees of individual liberty, then the
rationality of the entire 1968 constitution would be endangered. ' 23 5
In developing this newly discovered "germanity" test in Smith,
Justice England also developed the analogy he drew in Weber between
amending the constitution and enacting a statute.23 According to
Justice England, "Inherent in the amendatory process for the Constitution, by necessary implication, is the same notion of 'germaneness'
which controls the exercise of amendatory powers for general legislation." 23, He argued in Smith that legislators who are bound by
standards of "germanity" when making statutory law should be bound
by those same standards when making changes in the state constitution.
In effect, the Snith court maintained that the constitution implies
a test for legislatively proposed amendments very similar to the "one
subject" rule imposed on the more conventional lawmaking process
by article III, section 6. It is well settled regarding Florida statutes
that "[w]here all the provisions of an act are germane to the subject
and are properly connected with it, the criticism that it violates
constitutional provisions restricting each law to one subject is not
231. Eight constitutional amendments were proposed by the legislature and placed
on the referendum ballot in 1976. Of the eight, only the administrative procedures
amendment was challenged in court.
232. 338 So. 2d at 830.
233. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 18 was the section to be amended. See text accompanying
note 19 supra for the full text of the proposed amendment.
234. 338 So. 2d at 830.
235. Id.
236. See text accompanying notes 199-202 supra.
237. 338 So. 2d at 830.
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well founded." 2 In Smith, the court seemed to be employing the
same criteria to evaluate a proposed constitutional amendment.
Undoubtedly, at least part of the court's motivation for using these
criteria was to preserve the coherence of the constitution. This was
certainly one reason the court recoiled at the Secretary of State's
suggestion that, since three distinct alternatives-"amendment of a
section or revision of one or more articles, or the whole"-are available
to the legislature in proposing constitutional changes, "the legislature
can frame by one name whatever would be valid under any one of
them."' 239 The court apparently feared this would lead to the constitutional confusion it sought to avoid.
In addition, the court was evidently concerned about the internal
consistency of the constitution. As Justice England explained:
No persuasive reason has been suggested for permitting wholly
random placements of constitutional provisions by legislative amendment. It is not neatness with which the subject of germaneness is
concerned; it is respect for the people's declaration that our organic
law shall be free from the confusion and uncertainty in operation
which inevitably attend constitutional inconsistencies and ambigui-

ties.2

40

The proposed amendment in Smith passed this innovative "germanity" test only by the slimmest of margins-and only with the
assistance of a puzzling judicial determination to decide the case on
the narrowest of possible issues. The court contrasted legislative oversight of executive agencies with the "panoply of protections""4 1 provided by the Declaration of Rights to which the amendment would
have been attached and found that it had only "the barest margin of
relevance.24 2 "This casual placement of an amendment in the Constitution," the court conceded, "reaches the outer limit of legislative
authority as conferred by the people in Article XI, Section 1. Put in
238. Oglesby v. Hand, 119 So. 376 (Fla. 1928).
239. 338 So. 2d at 828.
240. Id. at 830.
241. Id. at 829. The proposed amendment would have been added to article I,
which is the constitution's Declaration of Rights. Among the provisions of article I
are those barring imprisonment for debt, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures,
preserving the writ of habeas corpus, guaranteeing a jury trial for capital crimes, prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, preserving the right to trial by jury, and
assuring prompt justice and access to the courts. As the Smith court observed, these
fundamental rights do not seem to have much direct relevance to disputes between the
legislative and executive branches over nullification of rules promulgated by executive
agencies.
242. 338 So. 2d at 829.
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other terms, the amendment approaches the borderline of 'germanity'
' ' 243
to the provision it amends.

The Smith court even went so far as to compare the Secretary of
State's argument with the long discredited "evil" of statutory "logrolling" which was condemned by the supreme court in 1930.244 "The
state's position," the court declared, "would . . . accommodate the

placement of random and unrelated provisions without even the appearance of a nexus." 245 Moreover, "[u]nder this view of Article XI,
Section 1, there would be nothing to bar the Legislature from proposing a single amendment which in one section or article would
establish unicameralism, prohibit forced busing of school children,
and bar all forms of taxation on corporate entities formed or domesticated in Florida. ' ' 246 Such an aggregation of appeals to varied interest

groups, the court advised, would "exceed legislative power" under
the constitution.247

Furthermore, the court concluded, acceptance of the state's assertion would be inconsistent with "notice-giving requirements designed
to assure knowledgeable law-giving. 2431 This statement by the Smith
court is reminiscent of a similar concern voiced in Gunter. Justice
Thornal counted thirty-three additional constitutional amendments
which would have been required by Senator Gunter's petition to
create a unicameral legislature.2

49

"There is nothing in the proposal,"

he said, "to indicate to the people that it has this extraordinary
effect. ' ' 25 0 That is, there was insufficient notice to the electorate that

their vote in favor of the proposed amendment mandating a unicameral
legislature would have had such far-ranging consequences.
The Smith court seemed to be hinting that the same infirmities of
243. Id.
244. Id. at 830 n.21, citing Colonial Inv. Co. v. Nolan, 131 So. 178 (Fla. 1930)
(statute requiring the filing of tax returns by owners of real and tangible personal
property and also prohibiting the recording of deeds and bills of sale without stating
the post office address of the grantee held unconstitutional as encompassing two unrelated subjects). The Nolan court defined "logrolling" as the practice of including "in
the same bill incongruous matters having no relation to each other or to the subject
specified in the title ... ." 'd. at 179. Such devious legislative devices are prohibited by
the Florida Constitution, which requires that "[e]very law shall embrace but one subject
and matter properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in
the title." FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
245. 338 So. 2d at 830 n.21.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 828. The court pointed out in a footnote that, unlike legislation, there
is no executive "check" for errors, omissions, or inconsistencies in a proposed constitutional
amendment. Id. at 828, n.12. See note 44 supra.
249. 238 So. 2d at 833 (concurring opinion).
250. Id.
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insufficient notice infected the administrative procedures amendment.
As Justice England expressed it, "The state's suggestion that a proposed section amendment may in reality effect a revision of the entire
Constitution completely ignores the ... compelling notice-giving needs
which legislators should have for constitutional amendments." 251 He
noted that "[t]he deliberative processes of the Legislature are
surrounded by guarantees that the duly elected representatives of the
people will know what they are doing when they act in their lawmaking role." 252 He specifically mentioned the "one subject" rule and
the additional constitutional requirement that each proposed law be
25
accorded "three separate considerations.."
The obvious implication of these allusions, once more, was that
the same "guarantees" which "surround" the process of amending
statutes should also be employed in amending the constitution. If it
is essential that legislators "know what they are doing" when they are
changing laws, then it is certainly also essential that they be at least
equally informed when proposing changes in the constitution. And
it is essential, too, that the people "know what they are doing" when
they participate at the polls in the ultimate act of constitutional lawmaking. The Smith court implied that there were no guarantees that
any of these supposed essentials had occurred or would occur with
the administrative procedures amendment.
Yet the proposed amendment still passed the crucial "gerinanity" test. The Smith court placed it squarely, if somewhat uneasily, within the apparently roomy boundaries of article XI, section
1. The "outer limit" of legislative authority clearly was within sight.
But the "borderline" was not crossed. To be sure, the amendment had
little in common substantively with article I, section 18 of the Florida
Constitution. But that did not matter. "The limitation on administrative agency penalties has some connection, albeit tenuous, with the
sentence now added to allow the Legislature to protect the citizenry
from executive branch over-reaching," the court explained. 25 4 Consequently, "[tihe functional relevance of one to the other (though minimal) being established, our inquiry of necessity is curtailed. ' ' 255 And,
therefore, "[we find ourselves obliged to approve the placement of
this amendment on the November ballot only because there exists a

251.
252.

253.
254.
255.

338 So. 2d at 828.
Id.
Id; see FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 6, 7.
338 So. 2d at 829.
Id.
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reasonable basis to view the new sentence as germane to the provision
it amends."

'25,

Where constitutional provisions limit the otherwise plenary powers
of the legislature in the amendatory process, "the legislature is, by
implication, denied the power to take from or to add to the constitutional provisions."2 57 As Justice Whitfield explained in 1912:
The people of the state have a right
and they also have a right to require
agreed to and submitted for adoption
the existing Constitution, which is the

to amend their Constitution,
proposed amendments to be
in the manner prescribed by
fundamental law. If essential

mandatory provisions of the organic law are ignored in amending
the Constitution of the state, and vital elements of a valid amendment are omitted, it violates the right of all the people of the state
to government regulated by law. It is the duty of the courts in
authorized proceedings to give effect to the existing Constitution.

The proposal of amendments to the Constitution is a highly important function of government that should be performed with the
greatest certainty, efficiency, care, and deliberation.258
The Smith court quoted these words approvingly.259 "We have
always required the Legislature to meet the precise limitations which
circumscribe legislative amendment powers," the court insisted. 260 But

the Smith decision contradicted this sweeping claim. If Smith is testimony to the "precise limitations" on legislative authority to propose
amendments to the Florida Constitution, then those limitations are
not very precise at all. In fact, they might as well not exist.
Justice England labored diligently in Smith to define the limitations imposed on the legislature by article XI, section 1. No doubt
the "germanity" test, which he developed in so much detail in the
majority opinion, was meant to be applied by later courts in later
cases. Perhaps it will be. And the "germanity" test might have proved
useful-had the court held otherwise in Smith. But the results of
applying the test in Smith lead to the inescapable conclusion that
virtually anything can be "germane" to virtually anything else in
amending the Florida Constitution. The entirety of the court's opinion
in Smith amounts to a persuasive argument against the court's conclusion.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 831.
Maloney v. Kirk, 212 So. 2d 609, 612 (Fla. 1968).
Crawford v. Gilchrist, 59 So. 963, 967-68 (Fla. 1912) (emphasis supplied).
Smathers v. Smith, 338 So. 2d at 831.
Id.
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The Smith court indicated what it definitely would not accept
from the legislature as a proposed constitutional amendment. But the
example the court chose to illustrate what is constitutionally unacceptable is hardly realistic. It is unlikely that any legislature would
ever propose a single amendment establishing unicameralism, banning
busing, and barring all forms of corporate taxation in Florida. 261 Such
disparate concoctions exist only in the realm of the judicial imagination. It is far more likely that a future legislature will propose additional amendments akin to the administrative procedures amendment.
They may differ in substance. But, in the aftermath of Smith, future
legislative proposals will surely resemble the administrative procedures
amendment in style-vague, ambiguous, amorphous, and, most of all,
only passingly and perfunctorily "germane" to the part of the constitution they would amend. There is nothing in the holding in Smith
to compel the legislature to draft them otherwise.
Nor is there anything in the holding in Smith to persuade the
legislature to be more assiduous in providing notice to the people of
the actual implications of proposed constitutional amendments.
Justice England spoke of "notice-giving needs" which are necessary
corollaries to any consideration of a constitutional proposal by the
legislature.2 6 2 But those "needs" were disregarded in the decision to
restore the administrative procedures amendment to the ballot. If
the requirements of notice are "even more compelling" 263 for constitutional changes than for changes in the statutes, as Justice England
attested, then those requirements were obviously not compelling
enough in Smith.
It is interesting, too, that the Smith court dismissed without discussion Smith's assertion that the ballot notice provided for the proposed amendment did not meet the statutory requirements.264 Apart
from any consideration of the existence of notice requirements in the
constitution, it would seem that a court concerned with the need for
notice would at least discuss the statutory aspects of such an issue.
The "substance" of the administrative procedures amendment may
or may not have been distilled in the ballot notice, as required by
statute. Apparently the court was convinced that the statutory requirements had been met. However, the reasons for this judicial conclusion
were not offered as part of the opinion in the case. The court merely
announced in a rather terse footnote that the allegations of insufficient
ballot notice, together with the other issues dismissed by the court,
261.
262.
263.
264.

See
338
338
See

id. at 830 n.21; text accompanying note 246 supra.
So. 2d at 828; see text accompanying note 251 supra.
So. 2d at 828.
notes 19 &c54 supra.
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were "without merit and not sufficient to warrant discussion in the
time we have available."

26 5

The issue of notice is intertwined in Smith with the issue of separation of powers. The plaintiff's contentions concerning the separation
of powers in Florida were also deemed to be "without merit" by the
Smith court. 266 Yet the belief that the legislature gave no real notice

to the electorate of the alterations the administrative procedures amendment would have made in the traditional separation of powers in the
state was the linchpin of Smith's suit. All else in the suit revolved
around the plaintiff's conviction that, in voting on the administrative
procedures amendment, the people would be deciding whether to
make drastic and perhaps permanent changes in their form of state
government-without even knowing it.
A separation of powers among "legislative, executive, and judicial
branches" of government is ordained by article II, section 3 of the
Florida Constitution. 267 That same section provides that "[n]o person

belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to
either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein."268 As

the Supreme Court of Florida has pointed out,
The preservation of the inherent powers of the three branches of
government, free of encroachment or infringement by one upon the
other, is essential to the effective operation of our constitutional
system of government. .

.

.This doctrine is designed to avoid ex-

cessive concentration of power in the hands of one branch.2 6 9
There has always been an express recognition in the Florida
Constitution that the powers of government are to be distributed
among three separate branches.2 70 What Justice Thornal described in
Gunter as a "triune plan of state sovereignty" 271 was first adopted

when Florida was still only a territory of the United States in 1838.272
265. 338 So. 2d at 827 n.2.
266. Id.
267. See note 50 supra.
268. FLA. CONST. art. II,§ 3 (emphasis supplied).
269. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 276 So. 2d 25, 30 (Fla. 1973) (citations
omitted). See also State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1972); Simmons v. State, 36
So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1948); Sylvester v. Tindale, 18 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1944).
270. The current provision is substantially the same as its predecessor in the 1885
constitution. FLA. CONsT. art. II (1885). A similar provision appeared in all the earlier
constitutions, although the provisions in the constitutions of 1838 and 1861 were more
detailed. FLA. CONsT. art. III (1868); FLA. CONST. art. II (1865); FLA. CONST. art. II
(1861); FL.A. CONsT. art. II (1838). See also Alloway, Constitutional Law, 10 MIAMI L.Q.
143 (1955); Alloway, Constitutional Law, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 158 (1953).
271. 238 So. 2d at 833 (concurring opinion).
272. FLA. CONST. art. II (1838).
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This separation of powers has been Florida's blueprint for governing,
checking one branch with another and balancing the authority of all
branches in order "to protect individuals in their personal and
property rights from an abuse of any governmental power or au-

thority. "273
The people of Florida may abolish the separation of powers if they
wish.27 4 They may "impose any limitation on the executive, the legislature or the judiciary they see fit." 275 This was acknowledged by Smith
throughout the course of his suit.2 7 '6 However, the people also have
.adopted article II, section 3.27 Smith's conclusion that this constitu-

tional provision necessarily requires that any constitutional shift in
the separation of powers be done "expressly" and not merely by implication seems both logical and sound. Yet the separation of powers
was not even mentioned in the administrative procedures amendment.
Nor was it mentioned in the notice which appeared on the ballot.
The only indications the electorate had that the proposal might cause
radical changes in Florida government were produced by the publicity
surrounding Smith's suit and the campaign by Governor Askew and
his allies to defeat the amendment.
The threat that the administrative procedures amendment posed
to the separation of powers in Florida was one basis for the circuit
court's decision. 2 71 The parties devoted much attention to the issue
in their respective briefs.2 7 9 The refusal of the Smith court to even
consider the issue is difficult to reconcile with some of the qualifying
statements made by the court in the wake of that refusal. For instance,
the court took pains to point out that "the statute establishing the
suspension procedure, which was vetoed by the Governor, is not an
issue in these proceedings .... .280 Similarly, the court observed that
"by recognizing the propriety of this amendment to be on the ballot
we neither approve nor disapprove any statutory scheme for suspension. ' 2 8 1 In addition, the court pointed out that "the power of a
legislative committee to suspend agency rules is likewise a premature
273. Getzen v. Sumter County, 203 So. 104, 106 (Fla. 1925).
274. The federal constitution does not require state governments to maintain a
separation of powers. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Dreyer v. Illinois,
187 U.S. 71 (1902).
275. Fraser v. Gay, 28 So. 2d 901, 904 (Fla. 1947).
276. See text accompanying note 219 supra.
277. See notes 50 & 57 supra.
278. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
279. Brief of Appellant at 34-39, Brief of Appellee at 17-35, Smathers v. Smith, 338
So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1976).
280. 338 So. 2d at 831 n.24.
281. Id.
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issue at this time. ' ' 2 2 And, finally, the court took "note" of the reassurances by the state that the amendment would not endanger the
powers of the judiciary.283 The justices then quoted those reassurances
28
for good measure in a footnote.

4

At first glance, all this seems to conflict with the court's professed
conclusion that the separation of powers issue was "without merit."25
Indeed, these statements seem at least a tacit admission by the court
that the issue had substantial merit. However, the court apparently
believed that the issue either could not or should not be resolved at
that time. Even as it rejected the separation of powers issue on appeal,
the Smith court appeared to be warning the supporters of the proposed amendment that the interferences it threatened with the established balance of power in the state government might be construed away in a later suit. "If the amendment should be adopted by
the voters," the court predicted, "it may then become our responsibility,
in an appropriate case, to harmonize its reach and meaning with other
provisions of the Constitution. '28 6 But the proposed amendment had
not yet been approved by the electorate. The Smith suit required an
examination by the court of the procedure employed in proposing the
amendment, not an actual construction of the amendment. Consequently, the court concluded that "[t]o attempt at this time an interpretation of the proposal as it relates to other constitutional pro287
visions would be premature."
Thus, the Smith court virtually admitted the truth of Smith's
claim that adoption of the administrative procedures amendment
would have had an impact on far more than just the Declaration of
Rights in the Florida Constitution. The court seemed to concede as
well that further amendments, or at least further judicial interpretation, would be required to determine precisely what the proposed
amendment really meant. This amounted to an indirect admission
of the truth of Smith's assertion that the amendment was so vague and
the ballot notice so inadequate that the voters could not possibly
comprehend it.28s But judicial discussion of these aspects of the controversy was postponed until after the popular vote. The separation
of powers issue was "not sufficient to warrant discussion" by the hurried

282. Id.
283. Id.

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.
Id. at 827 n.2.
ld. at 831.
Id.
See note 54 supra.
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Smith court.28 9 It was left to be resolved by a later court at a later
date-pending approval of the proposed amendment by the people.
The court's aversion to premature construction is understandable.
But what the Smith court perceived as premature construction might
also be viewed legitimately as an overdue explanation to the people
of the meaning and the import of the proposed amendment. If not
commendable, the court's decision may nevertheless be defensible.
Still, it is surprising that the court would scrutinize a proposed constitutional amendment, declare that it might not "harmonize" with existing constitutional provisions, and then allow it to be submitted to a
popular vote.2 0 And it is alarming that the court would do so after
strongly implying that the legislative proposal did not fulfill the
"notice-giving needs" which are supposedly implicit in the constitution. 291 Yet that was the decision of the Smith court.
Faced with a similar choice six years before, the Gunter court
roundly denounced the petition for a unicameral legislature as a "constitutional subterfuge" which failed "to give warning to the electorate
of its contents.."292 It could be argued that the administrative procedures amendment was no less a "subterfuge" than the petition for a
unicameral legislature. This, of course, was Smith's claim. But the
Smith court was not persuaded. The notice issue was discussed, but it
was not determinative. The outcome of the "germanity" test determined the outcome of the case. And that outcome left the voters with
the imposing task of trying to fathom for themselves what the proposed
amendment really meant.
VI. CONCLUSION

Smathers v. Smith reveals the broad scope of the legislative power

to propose sweeping changes in the Florida Constitution with but a
single amendment. It also discloses how very little legislators are re-

quired to tell the people about the probable impact of such proposed
amendments. If the holding in Smith is truly indicative of the prevailing sentiment of the supreme court, then the limitations on the

legislative prerogative in devising such proposals and dispatching them
to the voters are few indeed. Perhaps a measure more contradictory
and more confusing than the administrative procedures amendment
will someday be spawned by the legislative process in Florida. Perhaps
the supreme court will find it in some way abhorrent to the letter
289.
290.
291.
292.

338 So. 2d at 827 n.2.
338 So. 2d at 828.
Id.
238 So. 2d at 833 (concurring opinion).
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and to the spirit of the constitution. But the acquiescence of the Smith
court makes it seem far more likely that the legislature will once again
prevail in any renewed confrontation over a suggested amendment to
the constitution.
Thus, any additional limitations on the legislature must come from
within the constitution itself. The courts are unlikely to impose such
limitations on their own. Article XI, section 1 should be amended by
the people to place additional and substantial checks on the legislative authority to propose constitutional changes. This much is clear.
However, it is not at all clear what amendments should be made. And
the record of the court in construing the current provisions in section
1 does not offer much encouragement to would-be reformers.
One conclusion that can certainly be drawn from Smith is that only
the most egregious of proposed constitutional amendments will be
kept from the voters if the amending article is not changed. From one
perspective, the overwhelming defeat of the administrative procedures
amendment at the polls might be seen as adequate redemption for the
court's decision to let the people vote on the issue. But the supreme
court played no role in this redemption. The defeat of the amendment was not by any means the result of the court's decision. Rather,
it was the consequence of a concerted campaign by the opponents of
the amendment.
The virtual anonymity which characterized the administrative procedures amendment while it remained in the legislature did not prepare its supporters for the attention it later received. If nothing else,
Chesterfield Smith's unsuccessful suit undoubtedly contributed to the
eventual demise of the amendment by making it the object of statewide debate. This, combined with the campaigning of Governor Askew
and the animosity of the media,2 9 3 produced a landslide vote against
the proposal.
But prominent lawyers and popular governors may not always be
available to attract public attention to questionable legislative acts.
Public notice of the administrative procedures amendment was
generated primarily by the organized opposition to the amendment,
not by the legislature's actions in placing it on the referendum ballot.
If the legislature can approve with so little fanfare a measure envisioning a fundamental change in the separation of powers, then how much
less fanfare will accompany legislative acts of lesser significance? If
one such amendment can make the ballot, then why not another one
just as deceptive and just as perplexing next year or the year after?
The defeat of the administrative procedures amendment did not
293.

See note 86 supra.
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end the debate over the separation of powers in Florida. The debate
continues unabated outside the court's chambers. The separation of
powers is apparently a matter of much concern to the Constitution
Revision Commission. Indeed, an effort has been made to revive the
administrative procedures amendment in slightly different form as
part of the proposed revision.2

1

4

Although this effort seems clearly con-

294. On November 16, 1977, the Constitution Revision Commission voted 25-7 to
propose the following language to the people as article III, § 19 of a revised Florida
Constitution:
Section 19. Rule-making authority of administration agencies.-The legislature
shall maintain continuing oversight of administrative rule-making. The legislature may by concurrent resolution nullify any administrative rule and shall
establish a procedure by general law for the temporary suspension of administrative rules.
Proposal No. 61, Constitution Revision Commission of Florida, November 16, 1977. See
Florida Times-Union, Nov. 17, 1977, at B-l, col. 1.
This proposal was introduced by Commissioner John Ware, a member of the state
Senate and one of the early supporters of the administrative procedures amendment.
See note 20 supra. Another commissioner, Attorney General Robert Shevin, moved to
reconsider the vote in favor of Ware's proposal; but his motion failed, 24-7. Proposal
No. 61, supra.
While the Ware proposal differed in some respects from the administrative procedures
amendment, it would have had similar and perhaps even more far-reaching affects. If
adopted, the proposal would evidently have elevated the Joint Administrative Procedures
Committee to constitutional status. This would not have resulted from approval of the
administrative procedures amendment. Also, unlike the administrative procedures amendment, the Ware proposal did not specify the grounds on which the legislature could
nullify an administrative rule. The administrative procedures amendment limited such
suspensions to rules "without or in excess of delegated legislative authority." See text
accompanying note 19 supra. There were no such limitations in the Ware proposal.
Moreover, the Ware proposal did not contain the language in the administrative procedures amendment which would have allowed the governor and cabinet to defer legislative suspensions of administrative rules by a majority vote. See text accompanying note 19
supra. This omission would have broadened further the already extensive powers of the
Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. And, finally, like the administrative procedures amendment, the Ware proposal provided for nullification by concurrent resolution, thus circumventing the executive veto.
There may be some legitimacy in seeking constitutional recognition of the need for
legislative oversight of administrative rule-making. But the Ware proposal would 'have
enhanced considerably the powers of one legislative committee and of the legislature as a
whole at the expense of the executive branch. Furthermore, Proposal No. 61 would have
resulted in the same usurpation of traditional judicial powers that was a necessary
corollary of the administrative procedures amendment. Had the proposal actually become
part of the Florida Constitution, the legislature would have been making the laws, and
it would also have been interpreting them.
These actions by the Constitution Revision Commission were merely another episode
in a continuing endeavor by the supporters of the administrative procedures amendment to overcome their defeat at the polls. Following that defeat, the 1977 legislature
expanded the powers of the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. As passed by
the legislature, Senate Bill 553 added language to § 11.60, Florida Statutes, granting
the committee standing to seek review of agency rules in court "on behalf of the legislature or the citi7ens of Florida ....
" Act of June 30, 1977, ch. 77-453, § 1, 1977 Fla.

1977]

LEGISLA TIVE AMENDMENTS

Laws 1872. This change was approved by a vote of 115-1 in the House and 34-1 in the
Senate on June 2, 1977. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1074 (1977); FLA. S. JOUR. 797 (1977).
The act provides that judicial review of agency rules cannot be initiated "until the
Governor and the agency head . . . have been notified of the committee's proposed action
and have been given a reasonable opportunity for consultation with the committee."
Act of June 30, 1977, ch. 77-453, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 1872. Moreover, review may be
sought only of a rule "to which the committee has voted an objection and which has
not been withdrawn, modified, repealed, or amended to meet the objection." 'd. This
bill was signed into law by Governor Askew on June 30, 1977. Id. at 1183.
Thus, Senate Bill 553 accomplished some of what the legislature sought to accomplish
with the administrative procedures amendment but apparently without alienating the
executive branch. Whether the new law diminishes the traditional role of the judicial
branch in resolving controversies over the proper interpretation of statutes is debatable.
Senate Bill 553 expressly recognizes the conventional responsibilities of the judiciary in
the separation of powers. It also seems to acknowledge the need for the executive to
exercise its longstanding responsibility to see that the laws are executed. However, the
wisdom of this legislation in the light of the continuing debate over separation of
powers in Florida may be questioned. See Sheldon, 1977 Revisions in the Administrative
Procedure Act, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
(1978); Tallahassee Democrat, Jan. 23, 1978, at
28, col. 1; Florida Times-Union, Jan. 23, 1978, at B-2, col. 1.
Although Governor Askew signed Senate Bill 553, he was not at all receptive to
Proposal No. 61. Soon after the favorable vote on the Ware proposal by the Constitution Revision Commission, Askew denounced the measure in no uncertain terms:
Most disappointing of all to me in the revision process thus far has been the
needless revival of the administrative procedures amendment-a dangerous and
deceptive proposal that was rejected by a landslide margin of nearly a half million
votes in the general election just one year ago. The latest proposal is not identical
in all respects to the defeated amendment. But it may have even more farreaching results.
Address by Reubin O'D. Askew, Governor of Florida, Florida League of Women Voters,
Tallahassee, Florida (Dec. 7, 1977).
In announcing his opposition to the Ware proposal, Askew recalled his reasons for
opposing the original amendment. Id. In addition, he stressed the augmented power that
adoption of the Ware proposal would have given to the Joint Administrative Procedures
Committee. "The proposal would allow the legislature to empower a single legislative committee to suspend rules promulgated by agencies of the executive branch," he said,
"without even requiring the committee to state the grounds for such a suspension."
Id. The Governor argued that "a solitary legislative committee would be able to frustrate
the efforts of the entire executive branch in executing the laws." Id. "It is my hope,"
he concluded, "that the Constitution Revision Commission will reconsider its vote on
this proposal." Id. See Tallahassee Democrat, Dec. 8, 1977, at 17, col. 1; Florida TimesUnion, Dec. 8, 1977, at A-13, col. 1.
Several additional proposals were made to the Constitution Revision Commission following the initial approval of the Ware proposal. No doubt they were inspired at least in
part by the continued adamancy of the Governor, who appointed 15 of the 37 commissioners.
Proposal No. 103 by Commissioner Jon Moyle would have replaced Proposal No. 61
with the following language as article III, § 19 of a revised constitution:
It shall be the public policy of this state that administrative rule-making shall
not exceed constitutional or statutory authority and the legislature shall establish by general law a procedure for the temporary suspension of administrative
rules by the judiciary.
Proposal No. 103, Constitution Revision Commission of Florida. Proposal No. 131 by
Commissioner Moyle and others would have supplemented Proposal No. 61 by adding the
following language to article V, § 3(b)(2) of a new constitution:
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Shall hear appeals from legislative decisions pursuant to Article III, Section 19
to nullify or suspend an administrative rule. The decision on such appeals
shall be rendered within 20 days of filing. Failure of the court to render a
decision in 20 days shall automatically reinstate the rule.
Proposal No. 131, Constitution Revision Commission of Florida.
But neither of these proposals was considered by the commission. Instead, the commissioners adopted Proposal No. 161, which would have replaced Proposal No. 61 by
adding the following language as article III, § 19:
Section 19. Legislative review.(a) The legislature shall maintain continuing over-sight of administrative rulemaking. Any rule may be nullified by law. Procedures may be established by law
for the suspension of rules between regular legislative sessions. Rules shall only be
suspended on the ground that delegated authority was exceeded. A suspension shall
not become effective for thirty (30) days, during which time any party may appeal
such suspension to the appropriate district court of appeal. Any other right of
judicial review shall not be affected as a result of any suspension.
(b) The appropriate district court of appeal shall hear appeals pursuant to this
section as provided by law and shall render a decision as to the validity of the
legislative action on suspension within twenty (20) days of filing of the appeal.
Proposal No. 161, Constitution Revision Commission of Florida.
This generally moderate proposal was approved by a margin of 31-3 on January 9,
1978, with Commissioners Edward Annis, Lew Brantley, and Thomas Barkdull casting
the only dissenting votes. Id. See St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 10, 1978, at B-12, col. 1.
Surprisingly, in the light of this vote, a second move to reconsider Proposal No. 61 failed
on January 11. The vote against reconsideration of the initial proposal was 19 to 15.
However, in view of the approval of Proposal No. 161, Commission Chairman Talbot
D'Alemberte ruled that Proposal No. 61 had been superseded.
Two days later, yet another proposal was offered, this time by Commissioners Barkdull
and Bill Birchfield. Both Barkdull and Birchfield had supported the original Ware
proposal. As submitted, Proposal No. 211 would have created the following version of
article III, § 19:
Section 19. Review of rules.(a) The legislature shall maintain continuing oversight of rules promulgated by
agencies of the executive branch of government. Any rule may be repealed by law.
(b) The legislature may establish a joint legislative committee to continuously review the rules adopted by agencies of the executive branch, and the committee
may suspend the operation of any rule until the sine die adjournment of the
next regular session of the legislature.
Proposal No. 211, Constitution Revision Commission of Florida.
This proposal by Barkdull and Birchfield eliminated altogether any mention of judicial
review. For all practical purposes, it would have revived the original proposal by Commissioner Ware. However, when debate began on the measure on January 26, Commissioner and Chief Justice Ben Overton moved immediately to strike the language following "branch" in subsection (b) and add:
After reasonable notice to the agency, the joint committee may seek judicial
review of the validity of an administrative rule exceeding agency authority. The
review shall be before the supreme court or such court as the supreme court may
designate in an expedited proceeding. The court may suspend the rule pending
judicial determination of its validity.
Proposal No. 211, Amendment No. I, Constitution Revision Commission of Florida.
Commissioner Birchfield offered an amendment to the Overton amendment, changing
"may" to "shall" in the final sentence and thus compelling at least temporary judicial
suspension of any challenged rule. Proposal No. 211, Substitute Amendment No. 1
to Amendment No. 1, Constitution Revision Commission of Florida. Commissioner
Dempsey Barron then suggested that "agency" be changed to "delegated" in the first
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trary to the will of the electorate as expressed in the 1976 referendum,
it may nevertheless succeed. The people of Florida may well be asked
to make important decisions about the separation of powers once again
when they vote on the proposed constitutional revision in 1978. Eventually, the supreme court could be confronted with the issue once
again. And, should that happen, it will probably merit much more than
a mere footnote.
Undoubtedly, the court also will be faced once again with the
unwelcome task of determining how much notice must be provided
for the people when the legislature proposes a constitutional amendment. "[L]awmakers who are asked to consider constitutional changes,
and the people who are asked to approve them," the Smith court
reasoned, "must be able to comprehend the sweep of each proposal
from a fair notification in the proposition itself that it is neither less
nor more extensive than it appears to be."295 It is difficult to believe

that the people were given a "fair notification" of the potential impact
of the administrative procedures amendment on their state government. And it is more difficult still to understand why the Supreme

sentence of the Overton amendment. Proposal No. 211, Substitute Amendment No. 2
to Amendment No. 1, Constitution Revision Commission of Florida.
Thus amended, Proposal No. 211 was adopted by the commission 34-0 as follows:
Section 19. Review of rules.(a) The legislature shall maintain continuing oversight of rules promulgated by
agencies of the executive branch of government. Any rule may be repealed by law.
(b) The legislature may establish a joint legislative committee to continuously
review the rules adopted by agencies of the executive branch. After reasonable notice
to the agency, the joint committee may seek judicial review of the validity of an
administrative rule exceeding delegated authority. The review shall be before the
supreme court or such court as the supreme court may designate in an expedited
proceeding. The court shall suspend the rule pending judicial determination of
its validity.
Proposed No. 211, First Engrossed Version, Constitution Revision Commission of
Florida.
With some stylistic changes, this compromise proposal will likely be presented to the
voters in November. It preserves the principle of judicial review. But it also allows a
single legislative committee to cause the suspension of a duly promulgated rule pending
the outcome of that review. And, in contrast to Proposal No. 161, Proposal No. 211 does
not require a judicial decision within a specified time. Presumably, the courts would
act quickly in an "expedited proceeding." But judicial haste is not required.
Proposal 211 undoubtedly would cause less harm than the administrative procedures
amendment. But it too would be destructive of the historical separation of powers in
Florida. While the principle favoring interpretation of the laws by the judicial branch
of government would be protected, albeit in novel form, the equally important principle
favoring execution of the laws by the executive branch would not. For the effective
execution of the laws by administrative agencies would be subject to delay and diminution
at every turn by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee.
295. 338 So. 2d at 829.

802

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:747

Court of Florida would place such emphasis on "fair notification" and,
at the same time, effectively deny it to the electorate.
As it is, the constitution places little emphasis on notice in its
provisions for constitutional amendments in article XI. Aside from
the brief instruction to place the "full text of the joint resolution and
the vote of each member voting" in the journal of each house, there
is nothing even remotely resembling a notice requirement in section
1. As the Smith court adroitly demonstrated, whatever notice requirements there may be in the technical distinctions between "amendments" and "revisions" are subject to the whimsy of judicial discretion.
The issue of notice is addressed almost as briefly in article XI, section
5. And the scant notice requirements of that section are virtually
meaningless. Section 5 provides for notice in the form of newspaper
publication of the proposed amendment "in each county in which a
newspaper is circulated" in the sixth week and in the tenth week before
the referendum vote. It is hardly necessary to document the conclusion
that a constitution which relies exclusively on legislative journals and
legal advertisements to publicize proposed constitutional amendments
guarantees little in the way of actual notice to a vast majority of the
electorate.
A search for more effective methods of notice might not yield much
beyond the legislative journals and the legal advertisements. No doubt
modern means of communication such as radio and television might
be employed to provide some additional notice. Conceivably, a statement to that effect might even be included in the constitution. And
surely there should be some constitutional requirement that the substance of a proposed amendment must appear on the ballot. The need
for this can readily be seen in the cavalier dismissal by the Smith court
of the statute requiring such a ballot notice. A constitutional requirement would not be so easily dismissed.
One option would be to adopt that part of the Model State Constitution which provides that "[e]ach proposed constitutional amendment shall be submitted to the voters by a ballot title which shall be
descriptive but not argumentative or prejudicial, and which shall be
prepared by the legal department of the state, subject to review by the
courts."2
Preparation of the ballot notice by the Attorney General
might help insulate the amendatory process from the temptations of
partisan politics. Judicial review of such preparation might also serve
the ends of fairness and objectivity.
However, more realistic notice to the people about legislative
efforts to change the constitution would be much better assured by
296.
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imposing more visible restraints on the amendatory process. Various
alternatives are available. Some have been tried in other states. For
example, in seventeen states a two-thirds majority of the membership
of each house of the legislature is necessary to propose a constitutional
amendment instead of the three-fifths vote mandated in Florida and
in eight other states. 297 Yet this would probably not impose much of

an added restraint on a legislature which passed a measure such as
the administrative procedures amendment with only a few dissenting
2 98

votes.

Another alternative would be to limit the number of constitutional
amendments the legislature could propose at any single election, as
three states have previously done.2 99 This would be more helpful, for
it would focus public attention on just a few proposed amendments
rather than on the increasing number of proposals that crowd, and
thus cloud, the referendum. Such limitations, though, should not be
used to restrain the right of the people to place proposed constitutional
amendments on the ballot by means of the initiative.
Recalling his unsuccessful suit and reflecting on the reluctance of
the court to remove legislatively proposed amendments from the referendum ballot, Chesterfield Smith urged the Constitution Revision
Commission at its opening session to recommend further restrictions
on the authority of the legislature to propose constitutional changes.
"I personally have become convinced quite recently that constitution
revision should be restricted to bodies set up for that sole purpose,"
he said in an obvious allusion to his unsuccessful suit. 00° "Accordingly,
I hope this commission will consider restricting the legislature in the
future to constitutional proposals relating to a single subject in a
single section."53 1
This suggestion has considerable appeal. Unfortunately, it might
not overcome all the obstacles to rational constitutional change which
were posed by the Smith decision. After all, the Smith court never admitted that the administrative procedures amendment was not an
amendment to a single section of the constitution, despite the plaintiff's
protestations. Certainly there were abundant implications in the court's
opinion. But the Smith court did not rule that the proposed amendment was really a revision, as Smith claimed. While the court came
297.
298.
299.
at each
300.
mission
301.

See Sturm, supra note 3.
See note 21 supra.
Kentucky allows the legislature to propose only two constitutional amendments
election. Arkansas allows three. Kansas permits five. Sturm, supra note 3.
Address by Chesterfield Smith, Opening Session, Constitution Revision Com(Jul. 6, 1977).
Id.
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very close to confessing the truth of some of Smith's assertions, it never
actually admitted any of them. And this should give pause to those
who might hope that the court would reach a different conclusion in
similar circumstances in the future.
Thus, there is no assurance that adoption of Smith's suggestion to
limit the legislature to proposing only section amendments would keep
schemes such as the administrative procedures amendment off future
ballots. A proliferation of such proposals could result despite the limitation, with the legislature offering constitutional revisions concealed in
the guise of mere amendments. And, so long as such proposals were
able to meet the undemanding dictates of the "germanity" test, they
would not be kept from the electorate by the supreme court. This
much is obvious from Smith.
All the same, Smith's proposal deserves serious study by those hopeful of reform. Given the current constitutional guarantee that revision
commissions will be convened every twenty years from now on, and
given the constitutional changes by means of the initiative, there is no
longer any justification for the legislative power to propose constitutional revisions. Legislative amendments are probably needed. But
legislative revisions are superfluous. If Florida's unique experiment
with a constitutionally mandated revision commission is to be successful, then the power to propose revisions at regular intervals should be
restricted to the commission appointed specifically for that purpose.
And the right to make any needed revisions in the interim between
revision commissions should be reserved to the people themselves,
through the initiative or through the constitutional convention, rather
than to their surrogates in the legislature.
Yet another alternative in amending article XI would be to incorporate the implications of Justice England's analogies in Weber and
Smith in the constitution. The same restrictions could be applied to
the legislature when proposing constitutional amendments as are
currently applied to the lawmakers under article III when proposing
statutory amendments. 30 2 Most noticeably, this would mean the imposition of the "one subject" rule on the amendatory process. Conceivably,
such a change could make the final product of that process more understandable to the voters. But importation of the "one subject" rule from
article III would be of little benefit if the rule were given the same
broad construction and the same gloss that the courts have given it in
recent years when construing legislation.3 0 3 And this would be the
FLA. CONSr. art. 3, §§ 6, 7.
303. See, e.g., Demko's Gold Coast Trailer Park v. Palm Beach County, 218 So. 2d
745 (Fla. 1969).
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probable consequence of such a change before a court enamored of
the loose strictures of the "germanity" test-a test which is, to a great
extent, simply a judicial restatement of the "one subject" rule.
However, still another potential alternative for amending article
XI is available in article III. A visible and effective check could be
placed on the legislature in the amendatory process in the form of an
executive veto. This would be without precedent. No other state
allows the governor any sizeable constitutional role in proposing constitutional amendments to the people, much less in keeping such proposals from the people. Proposing constitutional amendments has
always been a legislative power, with the checks on that power deriving
exclusively from the courts and from the people. The governor's role
in the amendatory process has been one principally of suasion, as
typified by Governor Askew's efforts in Florida on behalf of the "Sunshine Amendment" and in opposition to the administrative procedures
amendment.
Yet the arguments against allowing an executive veto of a proposed
constitutional amendment depend more on tradition than on reason.
Those arguments are based primarily on the historical role of the
legislature as a representative body and on the presumed communion
between the legislature and the electorate. The unspoken assumption
is that only the legislature can discern the deepest desires of the people
in such matters. The governor, however, is also a representative of the
people. He too speaks with the sanction of the sovereign populace.
And, unlike individual legislators, the governor is responsible to a
statewide constituency. It would not seem illogical to balance the predilections of these two independent constitutional authorities-the
legislature and the governor-in an effort to arrive at some positive
accommodation in proposing constitutional change.
As an example, the constitution could be amended to allow both a
gubernatorial veto of a proposed constitutional amendment and an
override of such a veto by a three-fourths vote of the members of
each house. This proposal is not really as radical as it may seem. Such
a change in the constitution would probably prove less significant as
an additional executive check on the legislature than as an additional
and a quite practical means of providing more effective notice to the
people about proposed constitutional amendments. A required threefourths vote for a veto override would undoubtedly not have deterred
the legislature from placing the administrative procedures amendment
on the referendum ballot since the measure had virtually no opposition within the legislature. 0
304.
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posed amendment would have attracted public attention to the proposal and provided additional public notice of its possible consequences-in much the same way as Smith's suit.
A final alternative, and perhaps the most feasible alternative, would
be to amend article IX, section 1 to require a majority vote by two
consecutive regular sessions of the legislature as a prerequisite to placing
a proposed constitutional amendment on the referendum ballot. In contrast to the suggestion of allowing an executive veto, there is ample
precedent for this proposal. Separate votes by successive legislatures
were required by slightly different provisions in the Florida Constitutions of 1838 and and 1868. 305 And, while this procedure was abandoned
in Florida with the adoption of the Constitution of 1885, it is still employed with some variations in twelve states3 06
Had two votes in two sessions been required when the administrative procedures amendment was first proposed, Chesterfield Smith's
suit might never have happened. The administrative procedures
amendment might have been defeated on the second vote. The battleground over the legislative proposal would have been in the legislature and not in the courts. The legislature would probably have voted
as it did in the 1976 regular session. Governor Askew would doubtless
have voiced his displeasure, as he did, following that session. And,
most likely, the competing parties in the controversy would have converged in political combat over the necessary second vote of approval
in the 1977 regular session.
In the meantime, a year would have passed. The legislators would
have been better prepared to weigh the possible consequences of the
proposed amendment before casting their second votes. And the people
too would have been better prepared to cast their votes if it proved
necessary. Given the circumstances, surely the second vote would not
have been as hurried or as unpublicized as the first.30 7 And, whatever
the outcome of that second vote, the people would have been given
substantial additional notice of the possible effects of the administrative procedures amendment.
As Justice Drew explained in Gunter, the overall aim of the 1968
revision was to offer the people of Florida a constitution they could
vetoes of bills proposing statutory changes, which are passed by a majority vote in each
house. FLA. CoNsT. art. 3, § § 7, 8. Since the passage of a joint resolution requires a twothirds vote in both houses, it would seem logical to also require a greater vote to override a veto of such a resolution.
305. See note 168 supra.
306. Sturm, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1974-1975; in T14E BOOK
OF THE STATES, 1976-1977 at 161, 175 (1976).
307. See text accompanying notes 14 and 15 supra.
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read and understand and live by.3 0 8 "The purpose of the long and
arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions
of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968," he
said, "was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the
state a workable, accordant, homogeneous and up-to-date document."3 9
No doubt the Supreme Court sought to further this abiding ambition
in Smith. The "germanity" test was surely intended to eliminate the
"inconsistencies and conflicts" in article XI, section 1. But the court's
decision only added to the "inconsistencies and conflicts" which
surround legislative efforts to amend the Florida Constitution.
If anything should be clear in a constitution, it is how that constitution may be changed. Yet article XI, section 1 of the Florida Constitution is anything but clear. Making fine distinctions between such
words as "amendment" and "revision" may seem trivial.3 10 Yet these
words have different connotations, not only to lawyers and legislators,
but to many other people as well. It may be difficult, too, to define a
concept as elusive as "fair notification." But there can be little real
justification for allowing the people to vote on an issue when the
people are not really told what they are deciding.
The legislators who sponsored the "daisy chain" amendments that
were rejected in Rivera-Cruz were at least candid in acknowledging
that those amendments would have changed virtually the entire state
308. 238 So. 2d at 892.
309. Id.
310. The distinctions between an "amendment" and a "revision" may seem less
trivial if the Constitution Revision Commission decides to submit its proposed changes
to the people in 1978 as a series of separate proposals rather than as a single proposal.
Commission Chairman Talbot D'Alemberte has suggested that this might happen.
Tallahassee Democrat, July 17, 1977, B-l, col. 4. It seems likely because of the apparent
decision by the commission to propose major changes in the document.
This plan, however, might be subject to constitutional challenge. Article XI, section 2
provides that the commission shall file "its proposal, if any, of a revision of this constitution or any part of it" with the Secretary of State not later than 180 days prior to the
general election (emphasis supplied). It is uncertain whether this language will allow
the individual amendments envisioned by D'Alemberte. It is also uncertain whether
the legislature is precluded from exercising its authority under article XI, section 1 to
submit separate proposals for constitutional revision to the people at the same time the
vote is held on the proposal of the revision commission.
Commissioner and Senate President Lew Brantley, unhappy over the commission's
proposal to abolish the elected cabinet system, has threatened to push conflicting proposals
through the legislature in time for a November vote. Tallahassee Democrat, Jan. 19, 1978,
at D-l, col. 2. Perhaps in response to this threat, the Constitution Revision Commission
approved by voice vote on March 6, 1978, adding language to article XI, section 5 which
would give the supreme court the authority to resolve questions about conflicting amendments in revisions in expedited proceedings. If adopted, this proposal would apply to
conflicting amendments and revisions adopted simultaneously at the 1978 general election.
Proposal No. 258, Constitution Revision Commission of Florida.
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constitution. The state senator who suggested the initiative petition
that was rejected in Gunter was at least straightforward in saying that
his petition would have created a unicameral legislature-in addition
to whatever other changes it might have caused. But the sponsors of
the administrative procedures amendment were neither candid nor
straightforward in what they told the people about their proposal.
Whatever that proposal may or may not have been, it was certainly
not what it appeared to be. The administrative procedures amendment
may well have been intended to dispel a "phantom government." But
it might also have created a very different form of government for
Florida. And the people of Florida were told nothing by the legislature of this possible result of their referendum vote.
It is easy to say, in the democratic spirit, that the people can comprehend even the most complex of issues. No doubt they can-if they are
given the chance.-11 But why should issues be made any more complex
than necessary? Why should the people not be properly and adequately
informed when they vote? The "notice-giving requirements" to which
Justice England alluded in Smith should not be implied.l 12 They
should be explicit. The Supreme Court of Florida should not be left
to search for notice requirements between the lines of the state constitution.
At the very least, one brief sentence should be added to article XI,
section 1:
The people shall be given fair and adequate notice of the contents
and the consequences of any amendment or revision proposed by
joint resolution of the legislature.
This alone might help avoid future dilemmas such as Smathers v.
Smith. It would certainly add credibility and coherence to legislative
efforts to amend the Florida Constitution.
JAMES BACCHUS

311. One possible indication that the people did not fully understand the administrative procedures amendment might be the fact that, of the referendum proposals on the November ballot, fewer votes were cast on the administrative procedures
amendment than on any other proposal. Only 1,939,401 voters expressed an opinion on
the administrative procedures amendment. In contrast, 2,227,566 voted either for or
against the Sunshine Amendment. A total of 3,150,631 Floridians voted in the presidential election which was on the same ballot. Florida Secretary of State, Tabulation of
Official Votes, Florida General Election, Nov. 2, 1976.
312. 338 So. 2d at 828.

